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SOMMAIRE
Ce mémoire développe l’argument suivant lequel la véritable vertu est réalisable et
durable en dépit d’importants exemples historiques et expérimentaux qui remettent en
question la fiabilité du caractère moral face à des situations difficiles sur le plan éthique.
L’exégèse commence par donner un aperçu de plusieurs exemples contemporains
courants qui sembleraient miner la fiabilité et la stabilité du caractère éthique. Il s’agit,
notamment, du reportage éclairé de Hannah Arendt sur le procès d’Adolf Eichmann, des
expériences sociologiques menées par Stanley Miigram et Philip Zimbardo, et enfin, des
actes méprisables du personnel militaire à Abu Ghraib. Le mémoire traite ensuite de
l’argument situationniste qui, fondé sur des expériences comme celles mentionnées plus
haut, arrive à la conclusion philosophique que la situation, et non le caractère, détermine
invariablement le comportement. En réponse à cette approche defaitiste, le mémoire fait
appel à la sagesse intemporelle de Platon, notamment dans La République, pour ce que
l’on considère ici comme étant une explication supérieure de la vertu chancelante
observée, et surtout, de la possibilité pour l’homme d’avoir accès à la vertu. Platon
soutient que la véritable vertu ne vacille jamais et que la faiblesse éthique trahit ce qui est
essentiellement une moindre apparence de vertu résultant non pas de la réflexion et de la
connaissance approfondie du bien, mais des us et coutumes qui reflètent souvent les
fausses perceptions quant à la bonne mesure. Il résume le message optimiste que la vertu
est leftuit de la philosophie quand il écrit que « l’excellence n’a pas de maître; selon qu’il
[l’homme] lui accordera du prix ou ne lui en accordera pas, chacun en aura beaucoup ou
peu. (617e)
Mots Clés
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SUMMARY
This essay will argue that true virtue is attainable and sustainable in spite of the
significant historical and experimental examples that cal! into question the reliability of
moral character in the face of ethically chaïlenging situations. The exegesis begins by
providing insight into several prevalent contemporary examples that seemingly
undermine the reliability and stability of ethical character. These include, Hannah
Arendt’s discerning account of the trial of Adoif Eichmann, the sociological experiments
conducted by Stanley Miigram and Philip Zimbardo, and finally, the despicable display
of the military personal in Abu Ghraib. The essay then turns to the Situationist argument
which, based on experiences and experiments such as the ones mentioned above, arrives
at the philosophica! conclusion that situation, not character, will consistently determine
behavior. In answer to this defeatist approach the essay appeals to the timeless wisdom
of Plato, notably in The Repubtic, for, what is considered here to be, a superior
explanation ofthe faltering virtue observed and more importantly the human capacity for
virtue. Plato contends that true virtue does flot waver under any circumstances and that
ethical weakness betrays what is, essentially, the mere appearance of virtue resulting, flot
from profound reflection and knowledge of the good but, from habit and custom ofien
reflecting mistaken beliefs as to right action. Plato summarizes the optimistic message
that virtue is the fruit ofphiiosophy where he writes, “excellence knows no master; a man
shah have more or less of her according to the value he sets on her.”(6 17e)
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Introduction
This essay seeks to contribute, albeit humbly, to the age-old ethical question of
whether or not individuais can be relied upon to consistently behave virtuousÏy even
when confronted with highly challenging ethical dilemmas. It aspires to ffirther our
understanding as to the factors that motivate individuais to either reliably remain tme to
their moral convictions or to deviate from their alleged ethical principles, sometimes with
terrifying consequences, in the face of the pressures inherent to certain ethically charged
situations. Underiying this quest is the optimistic conviction, inspired and substantiated
by the timeiess wisdom of Platonic ethics, that the moral conduct of a truÏy virtuous
person will not waver even under the most challenging of circumstances. The essay will
argue, flot only the plausibility but ultimately, the necessity of such a hypothesis in
answer to the worrisome instances oflack ofvirtue to which we bear witness.
Historical experiences and sociologicai experiments attesting to the weakness of
human character when put to the test are, unfortunately, plentiful. Several amongst these
wiii be examined in the hope of gaining greater insight into the intricacies of ethical or
non-ethical conduct in morally probiematic situations. Towards this end, Hannah
Arendt’s iliuminating work, Eichrnann in Jertisaleni, A Report on the BanaÏity of Fuit
(1964), will be explored as an introduction to the disturbing hypothesis that grave moral
misconduct is flot necessarily the resuit of an aberrant evil minority, as is commonly heid.
Instead, Hannah Arendt looks to the case of Ado1f Eichmann, a nazi war criminal whose
trial she chronicles, as representative of the oflen prosaic nature of contemptuous
behaviour. This argument is corroborated by the pivotai sociological studies on
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obedience conducted by Stanley Miigram, as documented in Ohedience to Auihority
(1974). Milgram’s findings, which shocked both academic and lay persons alike, wili be
discussed as they reveal the overwhelming propensity of ordinarily good individuals,
motivated principally by the desire to obey authority, to induce what they believed to be
painful and potentially life threatening electrical shocks to innocent victims. Similarly,
Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment (1971) will be examined so as to show the
potentially negative influence of mies, symbols, group identity and situational validation
on the moral behaviour of typically upstanding individuals. Finally, an analysis of the
recent shocking occurrences at Abu Ghraib prison (2003) provides yet another glimpse at
the seemingly precarious nature ofevil by unmasking the apparent facility with which the
common man relinquishes his previously held values and moral principles. The banal
face of ethïcal weakness to which these exampies attest has the destabilising effect of
democratising the capacity for immorality, even profound evil, and, as a result, putting
into question our traditional perception of character as generaliy reliabie and stable. It
begs the crucial question as to whether or flot there is an AdolfEichmann in every man.
Questions such as these have led contemporary theorists, namely Situationists, to
concede to the inevitabiiity of poor ethical conduct and consequently incorporate it into
their ethical philosophy. Situationist theorists daim that our traditional, supposedly
misguided, conception of good character must be replaced by an empirically justified
alternative. In response, they put forth a theoiy of social psychoiogy based upon three
fundamental principles. First, that behaviour is not detennined by individual character
but by situational constraints. Second, that a traditional conception of stable character
traits is inaccurate and finally that virtues are not interrelated rendering them powerless in
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predicting future behaviour. This somewhat dismal depiction of human character leads
these theorists to the cumbersome conclusion that the only morally prescriptive recourse
available is the avoidance of ethïcally compromising situations. As the analysis that
follows wlll show, the problems associated with this approach are plentiful as they resuit
in a precarious situational relativism that expects morally unreliable agents to, flot only,
successfully predict ethical pitfalls but to possess the will and strength required in order
to side-step them.
This situationist perspective is by no means novel and can be traced as far back as
Piato’s The Repttbhc. Herein Socrates’ interlocutor, Glaucon, presents the argument that
the purpose of justice is to maintain social order and that people stifle their truc desire
towards unjust behaviour out of fear of suffering injustice themselves. In order to
illustrate these points Glaucon recounts the story of a mari, Gyges, who steeis a ring from
a corpse found in a bronze hollow horse in a chasm below the earth. He soon discovers
that the ring has magical powers rendering him invisible at will. Gyges uses this mysticai
force to gain wealth and power through deception and murder. Glaucon goes so far as to
say that if there were two such rings one in the hands of an apparently just man and the
other an unjust man the outcome would be identical in both cases. For Glaucon, Gyges
represents the common man, his actions reftect the wiilingness in ail of us to commit
injustice so as to satisfy our self-interest if the fear ofconsequences is eliminated.
The remainder of The Repubtic represents, in large part, Socrates’ answer to the
question underlying GÏaucon’s argument as welI as that of the situationists, namely, why
justice, or right conduct as understood by the ancients, ïs desirable as an end in itself and
how cari its consistent realisation be assured9 Socrates’ compelling argument, explaining
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the apparent contradiction between the commonly held view of virtuous character as
attainable and sustainable and the practical examples that seem to undermine it,
culminates in and is encapsulated within the myth of Er, which concludes The Republic.
Plato argues that disappointing ethical performance resuits flot from a lack of human
potential for vïrtue but from deficient knowledge as to what constitutes right behavior.
He contends that much of the apparent ethical conduct perceived under ordinary
circumstances fails short when presented with morally problematic situations because h
results not from profound knowledge of right action but from habit. Tme virtue is
achieved only when false knowledge, such as commonly held opinions, oflen at the foot
of habituated practices, the validity of which has neyer been meaningffihly tested, is
exposed and replaced with true knowledge. Virtue is therefor, according to Plato, the
fruit of phiÏosophy, or the acquisition of pure knowledge accomplished through the
continuous self and other, examination known as the diaÏectic. Plato eloquently
summarizes, what is considered here to be, the key to the realization of true virtue where
he writes that “excellence knows no master; a man shah have more or less of her
according to the value he sets on her.”(6 17e)
The above exegesis is followed by a summary of the Platonically inspired answer to
the situationists’ empirical observations of lack of virtuous character as representing a
theoretical point of departure as opposed to a philosophical conclusion. More clearly,
while Plato acknowledges the occurrence of imperfect ethical conduct, as testified to by
the fact that The Republic constitutes his response to the inadequate ethical behaviour he
observed in Greek society, he understands it to be a departure from, flot a confirmation of
the lack of human excellence. It is due to this ffindamental difference that Socratic
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ethics help to shed, what is considered here to be, a more meaningful light than do the
situationists on the nature of human virtue. As mentioned above, situationists view the
examples of Eichmann, the subjects of the Miigram and Zimbardo experiments and the
Abu Ghraib aggressors as conclusive evidence that ordinarily good people will behave
unethically in morally problematic situations. Unfortunately they fail to answer the ail
encompassing question as to why this phenomenon occurs. Socrates, motivated by the
desire to know, not simply describe, succeeds in explaining that seemingly good people
who behave badly are just that seemingly good but not fruty good. From this Socratic
perspective, the subjects discussed throughout the essay behaved unethically because
they were ignorant as to the good. A perspective that, as a detailed analysis of each case
will demonstrate, is corroborated by the conclusions depicting the banality ofevit arrived
at by the contemporary authors in questions; Hannah Arendt, Stanley Miigram and Philip
Zimbardo. The confirmation, provided by these authors, of the benign nature of the
forces undermining virtuous character contributes to the conclusion that the ethical
foundation wïth which these forces met was fundamentally lacking in structural fortitude.
Their analyses support the Platonic theory, espoused throughout, that lack of virtue is not
simply the result of ethical weakness in the face of moral challenge but is, in fact, the
cause ofthe ensuing weakness observed. As a resuit, the focus, rightffihly, shifis from the
power of the situation over character to the power of character over the situation if and
only if virtue is the resuit ofphilosophy and flot simply the illusion ofvirtue, which is the
product ofhabituated, unreflected and oflen unsubstantiated, societal norms.
further evidence supporting this conclusion will 5e shown to lie in the testimonies of
the agents of the historical and experimental examples in question wherever this is
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available, namely in the case of Eichmann and the Miigram subjects. f irst, as wïll be
seen, these individuals can be said to have held erroneous conceptions of what it means to
be a goodperson. Evidence of this can be found in their continued self- perception, in
spite of clearly unethical behaviour, as possessing fundamentally good characters. Such
distortions point to underlying misconceptions as regards the very nature ofvirtue and the
ethical principles it entails. Moreover, and perhaps most convincing, testimony as to the
validity of PÏato’s understanding of philosophy as the unequivocal road to virtue is
provided by the post experimental interviews conducted by the Stanley Miigram wherein
the subjects who resïsted situational pressures aftribute their ethical fortitude to
philosophïcal reflection of ethical questions on a variety of different levels.
finally, as the essay has attempted to render abundantly clear, the true optimÏsm
underlying Platonic and Socratic philosophy is the edifying power of knowledge and
consequently the necessity of rigorous and profound ethical reflection in the form of
institutional and private instruction. An optimistic message that rings as true today, if flot
more so, as it did over two thousand years ago. InterestingÏy enough, the situationist
perspective serves to, albeit inadvertently, illuminate the imperative first step towards the
actualisation of the ethical road map provided in The Repubhc; the danger of moral
complacency. Upon examination, the situationists’ shortcomings expose the concealed
peril associated with superficially acquired illusions of virtue, that is, the false sense of
security that lulls us into believing that we are moraÏly equipped thus detracting us from
the pursuit of true virtue. The consequence of which is the failure to identify and prevail
in the face of life altering ethical choices. In this regard, situationists contribute to the
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fundamental Socratic principle that at the foot of knowledge is the acknowledgement of
its absence.
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Chapter 1: The Banality ofEvil
Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality ofEvil
In order to expose the utility and validity of Plato’s ethical philosophy in
contemporary society it is important to understand its explanatoiy force relative to the
difficuit moral issues of our times. To begin, how can an optimistic perspective of
human virtue, upholding our capacity and natural tendency towards consistent virtuous
behavior, be reconciied with the widespread examples unmistakably attesting to a
predominant kick of human excellence. One of the most terrifying modem examples of
the barbaric potential of human beings lies in the tragic accounts of Nazi Germany
wherein seemingiy ordinary citizens committed unimaginable atrocities. Hannah Arendt,
in her moving and insightffil book entitled, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the
Banahly ojEvil (1964) asks and seeks to answer the very difficuit question as to why
individual’s who had led descent, law abiding lives, perpetrated extraordinarily evil acts.
Hannah Arendt approaches this exegesis by chronicling and analyzing the experiences of
one man, Adoif Eichmann, as he transforms from a common man to the orchestrator of
events leading to the deaths ofhundreds ofthousands of innocent people.
In the beginning of the Nazi mie in occupied Germany Adoif Eichmann served to
organise the deportation, driven by motivations of “ethnic cleansing”, of ail Jewish
persons. With the impiementation of Hitier’s “final solution” representing the
“extermination” of ail non-Aryan persons Fichmann, due to his supposed knowiedge of
“The Jewish Question” and his experience in transport organization, was appointed the
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job of transporting selected persons to the Nazi concentration camps. He did this
knowing that most - hundreds of thousands - of the peopie whose transport he organised
would, upon arrivai to their destinations, meet with their deaths. Hannah Arendt, then a
reporter for the New York Tirnes, wrote a series of articles, upon which her book is based,
chronicling and criticaily analysing the information emanating from Eichmann’s court
proceedings in Jerusalem wherein he was tried for his crimes and sentenced to death.
The prosecutor in the Eichmann case describes him as “the most abnormal monster
that the world had ever seen”.(p.253) If this depiction is accurate it serves to aileviate the
burden from the shoulders of ethicai philo sophy to explain Eichmann’s despicabie moral
performance. If he is ethically deviant, representing a rare abnormality in the spectrum of
human virtue, then his behaviour does flot threaten an optimistic perspective of virtuous
character. Simply stated, is Eichmann the exception to the mIe or the exception that
proves the rule? The troubling truth is, as Hannah Arendt goes on to say, that there were
many like Eichmann who “were neither perverted, nor sadistic, {who] were, and stili are,
terribly and terrifyingly normal.”(p.276) She writes that according to the Nazi party’s
own accounts the miirderers were flot killers by nature, in fact, party leaders describe
how conscious efforts were made to “weed out” those who were sadistic.(p.105)
Eichmann himself provided the puzzling testimony that he had neyer had any inclination
to kiil anybody and that he personally bore no animosity towards the Jewish people in
relation to whom he claimed to have aiways behaved in a respectful manner. Proof of the
validity ofthis statement, as well as to the fact that Eichmann was flot a sociopathic killer
devoid of conscience, can be gleamed from his one short lived attempt at mitigating the
bmtality of his actions. Early on in his career he had redirected a transport destined for
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Minsk or Riga, concentration camps where the Jewish passengers would have surely been
exterminated, to Lédz where the prisoners were spared death so as to serve as slave
labourers. Even the trial judge, in his closing statements, corroborates Eichrnann’s daim
to iiorrnatcy where he stipulates that “under more favourable circumstances it is highly
unlikely that [Eichmann] would ever have corne before [the present judge and juryj or
before any other criminal court.”(p.279) Further striking testimony to the sadly
unexceptional nature of Eïchrnann’s evil is the fact that he received “co-operation”, not
merely “compliance”, from the Jewish people themselves in the execution of his
responsïbilities. For example, Hannah Arendt speaks of the gmesome, yet undeniable,
accounts provided by Mi. H. G. Adier in his book entitled Theresienstadt 1941-1945.
Herein he reveals that ït was in fact the job of the Jewish administration, working within
the Nazi guidelines, and flot of Eichmann as the prosecution mistakenly alleged, to select
and subsequently narne the people who were to be executed.(p.106) In fact Eichrnann
himself had claimed to have lived his life, prior to “being charged with carrying out the
final solution”, in accordance with the Kantian categorical imperative as he understood it;
“that the principle of rny will must always be such that it can become the principle of
general laws.”(p. 13 5-136)
If Eichmann’s participation in mass murder did flot resuit from his sadistic,
pathological and monstrous nature then how is it to be explained? Hannah Arendt puts
forth several intriguing and convincing arguments in an atternpt to shed light onto the
factors that contributed to Eichmann’s ethical degeneration. Hannah Arendt begins this
exposition by dispelling several very basic and important questions; were Eichmann’s
actions motivated by seif-preservation or could he have acted differently without fear of
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immediate death? Did he do his best to reduce the gravity of the crimes he committed?
Finally, were his acts the direct enactment of superior orders9 The answers to ail of the
above is an unequivicable no. b begin, Eichmann admitted to knowing that one could
abstain from participating, effectiveiy drop out of the organization, virtually unscathed.
Accordïng to a certain von dem Bach-Zelewski, a witness for the defence, “It was
possible to evade a commission by an application for transfer. To be sure, in individual
cases, one had to be prepared for a certain disciplinary punishment. A danger to one’s
life, however, was flot at ail involved.”(p.91) Finally The Nuremberg documents confirm
that “flot a single case could be traced in which an S.S. member had suffered the death
penalty because of a refusai to take part in an execution.”(p.91) In answer to the second
question, as was mentioned above, Eichmann’s joit of conscience spurring an attempt to
manipulate the factors under his control so as to mitigate their destructive force was short
lived. Once his subversive activities had been discovered he participated in the
redirection of the persons in question to their original, or worse, destinations. finaiiy,
throughout the course of lis defence, Eichmann neyer argued that his actions were the
direct result of the imperative to follow the orders of his superiors. In fact, this une of
defence was flot available to Eichmann who towards the end of the war, as will be
discussed later, disobeyed the direct orders of his superiors having deemed them to mn
contrary to thefina/ solution.
According to Hannah Arendt the case of Eichmann provided insight into the question
of “how long [it takes] an individual to overcome his innate repugnance towards crime
and what exactly happens to him once he has reached that point?”(p.93) Hannah Arendt
points out that the participants were motivated to behave unethically due to their
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subscription to the simple notion that they were “involved in something historic,
grandiose and unique which must therefor be difficult to bear.”(p. 105) What is meant
here by difficzdt to bear is the notion that the successful execution of the grandiose
project of mass extermination required a substantial ethical readjustment, It necessitated
the altering both of one’s conscience and one’s “animal pity by which”, as Ms Arendt
points out, ail moral men are affected in the presence of human suffering. Conscience,
she writes, was apparently quite easily overcome, as will be discussed later, while more
sophisticated trickery had to be employed so as to suppress “animal pity”. Towards this
end, Himmier, a notorious nazi leader, used the “simple and effective trick” ofredirecting
these instincts towards the perpetrator himself. As a resuit, instead of feeling pity for the
victim the perpetrators would direct the pity towards themselves, in the form of “what
horrible things T had to watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task
weighted upon my shoulders.”(p.93) As regards conscience, the simple fact of war can
be said to have brought about an altered personal attitude towards human life where
suffering and death, which were ever-present, became almost commonplace.
Nonetheless, as Hannah Arendt points out, whule the devastation of war may have
worked to ease the perpetrator’s consciences this was superfluous since the
“extermination machinery” and its bureaucratic accomplice, already in place, had been
perfectly and laboriously conceived prior to the outbreak ofwar and the horrors it entails.
Eichmann provides us with his own account of the factors contributing to the
transformation of his conscience as it had served him under ordinary circumstances to its
condition when he committed crimes that he would otherwise have considered abhorrent.
He depicts this loss of conscience as coinciding with the events that took place at the
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Wannsee Conference, a meeting amongst influential members of German govemment,
judiciary, civil service and military, designed to align ail groups in the implementation of
the final solution. What Eichmann, present only as secretaiy since ail guests far
surpassed him in rank, witnessed at this conference, apparentiy, changed him irreparably.
Eichmann testified that Heydrich, a senior officiai, had been worried about obtaining the
necessary support of “non-party members” in the murder of hundreds of thousands of
innocent peopie. Yet, as Eichmann pointed out, this did not turn out to be a valid concern
at ail. In fact Heydrich’s proposai was met flot only with acceptance but with
“extraordinary enthusiasm”(p. 113) to be involved and to participate in such an important
initiative. It was upon witnessing this unanimous participation that Eichmann
experienced, what he referred to as, a “Pontius Pilate” in that ail his doubts, “about such a
bloody solution through violence”, were now dispelled. “The popes of the third Reich”,
as Eichmann referred to them, had pronounced themselves. “Now he could see with his
own eyes and hear with his own cars that flot only Hitler, not only Heydrich ‘sphinx’
Mifiler, flot just the S.S. or the party, but the elite ofthe good old civil service were vying
and fighting with each other for the honor of taking the lead in these bioody matters.
Who was he to judge” he asks “who was he to have his own thoughts on the matter.1 The
rest went smoothly”, according to Eichmann, “and soon became routine.”(p. 114) By his
own admission, Eichmann describes having found safety in numbers. He appears to have
felt justified in what he was doing because it was the norm, and not only the norm
amongst the common man but the norm amongst the dite, the decision makers, the
lit is interesting to note that in Crito Socrates argues against being influenced by the “opinion of the many”
as opposed to the meaningful judgement of one who understands justice and injustice... and the truth
ïtself”(48a) Eichmann would have been well served to heed Socrates’ advice.
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knowledgeable ones. Moreover, one of the reasons why his attendance at the Wannsee
conference stood out so clearÏy in his, usually unreliable, memory was because it
represented one of the few incidents where he was actually included amongst such
important persons, an inclusion that Eichmann admitted to having strongly desired.
Clearly one ofthe most powerful factors in appeasing Eichmann’s conscience was that he
did flot encounter anyone who actualÏy opposed the Nazi genocidal agenda.
Hannah Arendt explains that the transformation that took place in Eichmann’s case, as
it undoubtedly did for many of the others criminals, was a necessary element in the
success of the Nazi objective. She points out that “mere compliance” would have been
insufficient in assuring the operational fluidity of such an elaborate malevolent system or
the mass participation of “operators who had been brought up on the commandment thou
shah not kill.”(p.l 15) Probably the most powerfiti contributor to what amounted to the
suspension of such deeply entrenched ethical principles on such a wide scale was the
normative aspect of Hitler’s directives. The ffihrer’s order of the final solution was
followed by a tremendous production of legally drafled rules and regulations. Hannah
Arendt distinguishes here between the directive force of a simple order as opposed to the
virtually unquestionable power of the law that Hitler painstakingly assured would be
attached to the final solution. The principle difference being that the validity of the Ïaw,
unhike an order, “was not limited in space and time”.(p. 149) As alluded to earhier,
throughout his defense, Eichmann acknowledges that it was the obedience to the law, and
not to superior orders, that lent legitimacy to the illicit activities he perpetrated. Hannah
Arendt accurately describes what amounts to the world turned upside down where she
writes that “just as law in civihized countries says thou shah flot kihl even if sometimes we
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have murderous urges, according to the law of the Nazi regime Hitler said thou shah kiil
even if ordinary desires are against murder.”(p. 150)
It is precisely Eichmann’s respect for the law, combined with his boundless
admiration for Hitler that lcd him to disrespect Himmler’ s orders at the end of the war to
save the Jewish people by terminating extermination at Auschwitz. Eichmann replied
that he would “seek a new decision from the ffihrer”.(p. 147) This position, as Hannah
Arendt explains, resulted flot from his fanaticism but from his desire first to obey the km’
according b Hitler and second to do what he considered to be his duty, based on the
distorted state of his conscience. With respect to the final solution the moral imperative
guiding Eichmann’s behavior was a tragic distortion of the Kantian imperative that he
claimed to have lived by. The moral maxim obligating each man, as legislator guided by
practical reason, to conduct himself as though the principles guiding hïs actions could and
should be principles of law, was distorted into the duty to “act as if the ffihrer, were he to
know ofyour action, would approve.”(p. 136)
In sum, Hannah Arendt’s account reveals the banaliiy of the elements contributing to
Eichmann’s cvii actions. As shown above the ftightening tmth is that Eichmann actively
and devotedly contributed to the slaughtering of practically an entire ethnie entity not
motivated by hatred, anger, mental illness, or profound ideological convictions but
simply as the resuit of another day’s work. This conclusion raises tremendous ethical
questions. How does his apparent norrnalcy and that of so many hike him translate into
our own ethical nature? Does Eichmann represent any maîi or consequently ail nîen in
their potential for evil under the right circumstances?
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The Powerful Impetus of Obedience to Authority
$tanley Miigram in his classical psychological experiment, documented in Obedience
/0 Authority: An ExperirnentaÏ view (1974) arrives at very similar conclusions, albeit
under exceedingly different circumstances, and consequently further inspires reflection
regarding these probing questions. Stanley Miigram conducted a fascinating experiment
testing the dynamics of obedience in the face of authority. More specifically he
questioned the degree to which ordinary individuals would obey orders emanating from
an authority figure directing them to induce pain on a protesting victim. Participants
were recruited under the guise of participating in a “study of memory and learning” at
Yale. The subjects, as the participants wîll be referred to, were selected and screened so
as to assure, to the extent possible, their psychological and emotional stability.2 The
original experiments were conducted in a university setting and the experimenters were
dressed in official lab coats, both of which were factors contributing to the legitimacy of
the experiment and the authority of the experimenter. The experiments began with a
staged role attribution supposedly determining whom among the volunteers wouÏd take
on the role of the questioner and who would be attributed the role of the student to be
tested. The subjects, unbeknownst to them, were aiways designated the role of questioner
and a fellow volunteer, as far as they were concerned, randomly received the role of
student. In fact the student was flot a volunteer at all but an actor who had been hired to
pose as a feÏlow volunteer. The experimenter then explains that the study is concerned
2 Attempts to explain the behaviour of the Mflgram subjects as resulting ftom a lack of appropriate moral
sensitivities on the part of the subjects have fallen short (Elms 1972: 135-6; Miigram 1974: 205: Muer
1986: 241). The consensus seems to be that the majority of subjects did possess appropnate ethical
sensitivities (sec Gibbard 1990: 5$-61).
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with the effects of punishment on learning and the student is lead into a room where he is
strapped into what resembles a “miniature electric chair” and an electrode is aftached to
bis wrist. The student is advised that he will be asked a series of memory testing
questions and that if he answers incorrecfly he will receive electrical shocks of increasing
intensity. The subject, the real focus of the study, is then placed before an impressive
control panel with a series of levers. The voltage level is clearly indicated for each lever,
ranging from 14 to 450 volts. The panel also consists of blatant designations indicating
the degree of intensity corresponding to the different levels of shock raiiging from “Slight
shock” to “Extreme intensity shock, Danger” for the higher voltages and ending with two
switches simply marked “XXX”. Each subject then receives a “sample 45 volt shock”
serving to strengthen the authenticity of the machine. The conflict arises when the
student, afler having answered incorrectly and received corresponding electrical shocks,
begins, at 75 volts, to demonstrate his discomfort by “grunting”. If the subject continues
to administer the shocks, the degree of the student’s manifestation of discomfort
simultaneously increases in intensity. The student progresses from adamant
verbalization, at 120 volts, to physical demonstrations of pain and pleas for cessation, at
150 volts, coupled later with cries of agony, at 285 volts, culminating with silence
allowing for the possibility that the student was unconscious or worse. Dunng the
shocking process many of the subjects who expressed doubts as to their actions or the
welI being of the student were flrmly and consistently ordered by the experimenter to
continue. They were told that they “must continue”, that “the experiment necessitates
that they continue” and that, while painffil, “there were no long-term consequences to the
health ofthe student.” As StanÏey Milgram points out, in order “to extricate himself from
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this plight, the subject must make a clear break with authority.” Quite astoundingly, the
great majority of subjects did flot live up to this challenge.3 Instead, sixty five percent of
participants willingly administered what they believed to be painful, even excruciatingly
painful and ultimately potentially lethal, electrical shocks of 450 volts to a fellow subject
in compliance with the directives of a legitimate figure of authority for what they
perceived to be an important endeavor.
It is abundantly clear that, while the psychological and emotional health of Adoif
Eichmann can neyer be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt, the subjects in the Miigram
experiment had been carefully selected precisely because they had no history of sadistic,
cruel, or psychopathic behavior. So why did these “normal”, by all accounts, individuals
behave in such an abhorrent manner? In Obedience to AztihoriIy Stanley Milgram
presents an explanatory analysis as to what he concluded to be the salient contributing
factors. As will become evident there are a number of parallels between Hannah
Arendt’s conclusions conceming the case of Adoif Eichmann and Stanley Milgram’s
analysis regarding the obedience to authority experiments.
To begin, Stanley Miigram points to the fact that the subjects participating in the
experiment were faced with a dilemma requiring them to choose between competing
values, namely the imperative flot to inflict injury onto innocent people and the duty to
obey superior orders. He points out that the duty to obey, which turned out to be the
Prior to conducting the expenment Stanley Miigram descnbes, in an article appeanng in Harper’s
Magazine entitled “The Perils of Obedience”. polling a variety of different people on their predictions of
the outcome of his study. Understandably they concluded ovenvhelmingly that the great majority of
subjects would cease to obey the expenmenter. Miigram notes particularly the comments of the
psychiatrist who was convinccd that the subjects would not exœed 150 volts. which coïncides with the
victim’s first dernand to be freed. They anticipated that only 4% of the subjects would reach 300 volts and
one out of a thousand, representing a paffiological minority, would administer the maximum voltage of 450
volts
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salient virtue, is a deeply entrenched value in most societies as it is a necessary condition
for the harmonious ffinctioning of the hierarchically structured social systems in which
we live.4 He points out that, for some, “societal systems” take on a life of their own
elevating them beyond the “norms of conduct and sentiments of mortals. So when the
experimenter demands that you continue this is considered an imperative transcending
the simple domain of human authority”.(p. 24) Yet, as Miigram goes on to show, the
degree of obedience correlates directly to the degree of legitimacy attached to the figure
of authority. In a variation of the learning experiment, designed to evaluate precisely this
phenomenon, Milgram changed the ratio of experimenter to subject to two to one. The
interesting consequence was that when the experimenters disagreed amongst themselves
the subjects ceased to shock the student. The subjects overwhelmingly sided with the
experimenter espousing the more ethical viewpoint. Eichmann, as discussed above, also
attributed his actions in part to his perception of the importance of obedience. Yet for
Eichmann, as Hannah Arendt points out, the object of his obedience was flot simply an
order from an individual in a position of authority but the taw. This comparison may
help to lend perspective to the degree to which Eichmann’s challenge far outweighed that
of the subjects in the Milgram experiments. The subjects succumbed to the pressure to
obey the directives of one authoritative figure the basic legitimacy of which, while
implied by the circumstances, was neyer directly or concretely known. Individuals such
as Eichmann succumbed to the authority of what had been decreed by the ffihrer, the
“It can. nonetheless, be argued that the need for non-aggressive behavior amongst citizens is of equal, if
not greater, importance to our communal survival. One possible explanaflon for the discrepancy between
the two virtues may be that there afready exists an important normative infrastmcture so efficient at
regulating aggressive tendencies that the need for the practice of this virtue on an mdividual basïs has
greatly diminished. In other words, the msufficient use of the principle of non-aggression may have
rendered mdividuals out of practice regarding its application.
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most powerffii man in ail of Eastem Europe, and supported, seemingly unanimously, by
the most influential inteliectual, political, and military figures of the state to be, the
irreffitable 1cm’ oJthe land.
The act of obedience to authority in general, whether it takes the form of an
experimenter or the Ïaw, has the added consequence, as discussed by Miigram, of
bringing about transfefence of responsibility. Stanley Miigram suggests that upon
submission to authority an individuat enters into an “agentic state” wherein he/she
relinquishes responsibility for his/her actions to an authority figure. The agent, who
cornes to perceive him or herseif as merely an instrument, surrenders both control over
the situation as well as a sense ofresponsibility, relative to the consequences ofthe orders
they execute, to the decision-maker. In Eichrnann’s case, as mentioned eariier, this
occurred on two levels. First, Hannah Arendt speaks of his boundÏess admiration and
respect for Adoif Hitler whose directives represented unquestionable dogma. Second,
she describes his moment of Pontias Pilate when he relinquished his responsibiÏity to
question the ethical validity of his role in the Nazi agenda. He concluded that the
German rnilitary, social and political elite whose knowledge, social and economic
standing far outweighed his own were in a far superior position to judge the moral quality
ofhis actions than he was. As Hannah Arendt so aptly concludes “he was neither the first
nor the last to be ruined by modesty.”(p. 114)
Miigram further argues that the ease with which one relinquishes responsibility for
his/her actions correlates with the degree to which the subject is removed frorn the
consequences of his actions. This phenomenon became quite evident in the course of
another variation ofthe experiment where the ratio of subject to student was increased to
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two to one. One subject was responsible for testing while the other administered the
electrical shocks. Thirty-seven of the fourty subjects in the testing role continued
shocking the student to the maximum voltage level. They were convinced that the real
responsibility for the infliction of pain resided with the person actually pushing the
button. Miigram interpreted these resuits as testimony to the fact that our conscious is
more easily appeased when we perceive ourselves as intermediaries and when the
consequence of our actions is far enough away so as to be easily ignored. This factor
must have played an important role in easing Eichmann’s conscience because
Eichmann’s participation in mass murder was conducted at a distance. While Eichmann
knowingly organized, orchestrated, directed and assured the execution of diabolical plans
resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths he neyer physically hurt anyone. Finally the
Nazi regime, fully aware of the efficiency of the distancing phenomenon, assured the
implementation of an elaborate bureaucratic machine intricately layered with endless
echelons of command serving to remove as many as possible from the end resuits of their
actions.
Another very important factor discussed by Miigram as contributing to the subject’s
diminished ethical behavior is the legitimacy of the context within which these acts were
pefformed. As was the case with Eichmann, the subjects gained confidence ftom the fact
that they deemed the experiment in which they were participating to be “important,
beneficial and useful to humanity.” Somehow what would otherwise be, by their own
admission, a despicable act becomes acceptable within the context of an important
psychological experiment or, in Eichmann’s case, the venerated goal of purifying the
world’s population so as to enable the Arian race to take its rightflul place. The human
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ability to redefine our perception of an act relative to the apparent legitimacy of its
context is typified by the example of a soldier at war who is convinced not only of the
necessity of his actions but also, and perhaps more importantly, of their moral quality.
Nonetheless, as Miigram points out, the subordination of the human consequences of
one’s acts to the allegedly legitimate nature of their context may engender, as we have
seen, exceedingly dangerous penalties. Perhaps, as wili be discussed later, exampies such
as those of Eichmann and the Miigram experiment must serve to remind us that the
unacceptability ofhuman suffering is not a principle that is open to negotiation.
Finally, the Miigram subjects, similarly to Eichmann, once they accepted the
legitimacy of the authority figure as well as that of the context, shifted their focus from
the conventional moral values that they claimed to espouse to the effective execution of
the task at hand. As did Eichmann, once the Miigram subjects entered the “agentic” state
they focused principally on ffilfilling the sense of duty that they felt towards both the
experiment and the experimenter. It appears that the subjects, and clearly Eichmann,
ceased to pass judgment on their own actions and concentrated on rendering themselves
worthy of the authority’s expectations. From then on they became lost in the details of
their endeavor. As Stanley Milgram expresses so concisely, “herein lies the essential
lesson of our study: ordinary people deprived of ail hostility, may in the simple execution
oftheir tasks, become agents of an atrocious process ofdestwction.”(p.22)
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Behavioral Deviation in the Stanford Prison Experiment and in Abu Ghraib Prison
PhiÏip Zimbardo conducted an experiment entitled the Stanford Prison Experiment
(SPE) (1971) which demonstrated that under the right circumstances individuals can be
seduced into behaving in an atypically unethical manner even in the absence of an
authority figure demanding compliance. The SPE focussed on the power of role
attribution, mie implementation, group identity, symbols and situational validation to
negatively influence ethical conduct. The experiment, conducted in the basement of the
Stanford University psychology department, sought to reenact a prison setting wherein
subjects, fully aware of the artificial nature of the experiment unlike the Miigram
subjects, were randomly attnbuted either the roies of prisoners or guards.5 Zimbardo
took on the role of “superintendent” and a student was given the role of “warden”. Rules
were then implemented delineating guidelines appropriate to each role attributed with the
aim of promoting “disorientation”, “depersonalization” and “deindividuation”. As a
resuh the prisoners were dressed in smocks without underwear the discomfort of which
was designed to contribute to their disorientation. They wore stocking caps on their
heads mimicking the shaven head of a military boot camp. The participants were then
assigned numbers, attached to their uniforms, instead of names the objective of which
was the deindividuation ofthe prisoners. Moreover they wore a smali chain around their
Zimbardo selected 24 out of the 70 applicants who replied to his newspaper ad. offenng $15 a day to
participate in a two week “prison simulation”, based on thefr psychological stability and health. These
participants were prcdominantly young Caucasian. middle class males.
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ankles assuring the continuous awareness of their status. Their movements were
confined and theïr activities restricted accordingly. The guards, equipped with wooden
batons, mirrored sunglasses and a self chosen khaki military style uniform, worked in
shifis and were allowed to return home during off-hours. They were instmcted to takeon
the role of ensuring prisoner compliance in any way that they saw fit, barring the use of
physical violence. The incredible outcome, within an astonishingly short period of time,
was the degree to which the subjects became immersed in their respective roles. The
guards embraced their authoritative roles and became increasingly abusive, the emergent
norm was the dehumanization ofthe prisoners in various ways. Prisoners were tormented
and given physical punishments including excessively grueling forced exercise. Guards
used bathroom rights and food portions as punishment and frequently denied these basic
necessities to the prisoners. They were forced to clean toilets with their bare hands and
there were cases where mattresses were removed and the prisoners were stripped naked
and made to sleep on the floor. Several of the guards became increasingly sadistic going
so far as to impose nudity and forced simulated sexual acts of humiliation. The prisoners,
in turn, as a group were driven to the point of attempting a prison breakout while
individuals experienced veiy real physical, emotional and psychological deterioration.
One prisoner developed a psychosomatic rash, others resorted to uncontrollable crying
and many experienced disorganized thinking. Two of the prisoners experienced such
severe trauma that they could no longer participate and were replaced early in the
experiment. The experiment was terminated ahead of schedule yet surprisingly it was flot
Zimbardo who initïally determined this to be necessary. It was a fellow researcher and
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friend ofZimbardo’s who, flot having been involved in the expefiment from its inception,
was horrified with the conditions she witnessed when asked at a later stage to assist the
researches. Zimbardo notes that out of over fifty partial witnesses to the prison only one
protested its moral acceptabiiity.
The important lesson to be learnt from the SPE is that some situations seemingiy exert
a very powerful influence over mdividuals causing them to deviate greatly and
unexpectedly from their usual behavior. In the Prison Experiment several very specific
factors were identified as contributing to the behaviorai transformations that resulted. To
begin, as Zimbardo expiains, the novelty of the situation rendered the subjects devoid of
any guidelines in the form of historical references or habituated behaviors and coping
mechanisms. As a result, supposedly stable personality traits previously considered to be
dependable proved to be unreliable in predicting future behavior. The novelty of the
situation further resulted in “ambiguous role delïneation”. That is to say, in a thoroughly
unprecedented situation the previously accepted societai and institutional mies and
regulations guïding appropriate or inappropriate conduct within a given role become
blurred. As a resuit the subjects look towards “situational validation”, or salient
principles upheld within the situation and cloaked in “ideology” to define role content.
The SPE also demonstrated the influential force of “role playing” on behavior even
when the roie attributions are cieariy contnved. The participants in the SPE quickly
internalized their roles and as a result many of them, as was the case with Eichmann and
the Miigram subjects, transforrnedtheir values, attitudes and beliefs so as to aiign them to
the demands ofthe moraily problematic situation in which they found themselves. In the
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prison simulation the majority of the guards succumbed to group pressure to participate
in or at least flot challenge what amounted to cruel and dehumanizing behavior.
The SPE has been criticized for, amongst other things, being highly anecdotaÏ and
subjective due in large part to the direct involvement of Philip Zimbardo in his role as
superintendent, which, critics argue, may have potentialÏy influenced the direction of the
experiment. Nonetheless, the human rights abuses that occurred in 2003 in Iraq and
Afghanistan have, regrettably, renewed interest in and strengthened the reliability of
Zimbardo’s findings. Moreover, the relevance of the SPE to actual military life shouid
flot surprise when considering that the study was originaliy funded by the US Navy in an
attempt to explain conffict withïn the Navy and marine corps’ prison systems. In an
article written in May of 2004 in The Boston Globe Zimbardo contends that many of the
specific sadistic and humiliating acts perpetrated in the afiermath of the Iraq war
resembled those that occurred during the SPE and which are sited above. In an article
published in the New Yorker entitled “Torture at Abu Ghraib”(2004) Seymour Hersh
discusses Major General Antonio M. Taguba’s report, inquiring into the accusations of
wrongdoings at Abu Gharib, exposing the widespread institutional failure that took place
at ail levels. Such faiiures, according to the report lead to “sadistic, blatant, and wanton
criminal abuses” at Abu Ghraib that included “breaking chemical lights and pouring the
phosphoric liquid on detainees; pounng cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees
with a broom handle and chair; threatening maie detainees with rape; ailowing a military
police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured afler being slammed
against the wall in his celi; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a
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broom stick, and using military working dogs to ftighten and intimidate detainees with
threats ofattack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.”
The question, of course, that both Zimbardo and Hersh attempt to answer is why the
apparently civilized soldiers who are responsible for the perpetration of these criminal
acts behaved in the monstrous way that they did? What motivated them to commit acts
that violated flot only profoundly entrenched ethical principle, but also the legal norms of
the Geneva Convention, and the institutional obligations of Army regulations? Zimbardo
and Hersh present two very convincing and somewhat overlapping arguments. In his
article ‘Power turns good soldiers into ‘bad apples”(2004) Zimbardo maintains his
classic argument that the soldiers’ behavior can flot be explained away by painting them
as sadistic and abhorrent monsters. Instead, he argues, they are ordinary soldiers who
were swallowed up by the situation in which they found themselves. As was the case in
the SPE the soldiers’ roles of power and authority in a novel, morally ambiguous,
environment with very lose behavioral guidelines created a vacuum of degeneration to
which almost everyone succumbed. According to Zimbardo under the right
circumstances human nature can be deviated towards evil; “some of the necessary
ingredients are: diffusion ofresponsibility, anonymity, dehumanization, peers who model
harmful behavior, bystanders who do flot intervene, and a setting ofpower differentials.”6
Seymour Hersh on the other hand believes that the evidence uncovered in General
Taguba’s report points clearly to the fact that the soldiers were flot acting independently.
In his much-discussed article, Mr. Hersh contends, and Mr. Zimbardo agrees, that the
prison guards, consisting predominately of inexperienced military police, were obeying
6 Exceipted from The Boston Globe edition ofMay 9. 2004.
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the orders ofthe military intelligence teams present at Abu Ghraib, which included Ci.A.
officers, linguists and interrogation speciaÏists, to “break the will of the prisoners”7. Mr.
Hersh’s point of view is supported by testimony documented in the Taguba report. For
example, during the hearing of Staff Sergeant Ivan L. frederick II letters to his family,
wherein he questions the moral acceptability of the practices within the prison, were
presented as evidence. In these letters, dating pfior to the public exposure of the abuses,
Frederick writes that when he addressed his concems of ethical impropriety with military
intelligence he was given the following answer; “this is how miÏitary intelligence wants it
done”. His lawyers further argued that the nature of the crimes committed were
cuituraiiy specific and consequently required a degree of knowledge regarding the
Islamic culture that went beyond the scope ofthe gaurds’ training. To highuight this point
Mr. Myers, one of the civilian defense attorneys, asked the following question; “do you
really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided
that the best way to embarrass Arabs and to make them talk was to have them walk
around nude?” Another witness, also accused of participating in the abuses, Sergeant
lavai Davis, describes being toid that the miiitary intelligence had “different mies” when
he expressed doubts as to the ethicai decency of the prison practices. According to
Hersh, when Davis was asked why he did flot report the questionabie behavior to the
proper authorities he answered that he “assumed that if they were doing things out of the
ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone wouid have said something. Also the wing”
where the abuses took place-”belongs to the MI and it appeared Ml personnel approved
ofthe abuses.” Hersh concludes his articie by saying that, contrary to the daims made by
Ail of the quotations in this paragrah have been excerpted from Seymour Hersh’s article “Torture at Abu
Ghraib” that appeared in the May 10 2004 edition ofthe ?v’èw Yorker.
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senior military officers and President Bush that this behavior, while despicable, must be
seen as exceptional, “Taguba’s report amounts to an unsparing study of collective
wrongdoing and the failure ofArmy leadership at the highest level.”
Judging from the arguments put forth by Both Zimbardo and Hersh the abuses that
took place at Abu Ghraib prison seem to provide an exampie of the destructive potential
of the combined forces of negative situational pressure and obedience to corrupt
authority. In the SPE the element of obedience to authority as responsible for the gaurds
degenerative ethical behavior was flot present, as the guards were ftee to structure their
behavior as they saw fit. The Milgram experiments were focused, almost entirely, on the
question of obedience to authority without any significant regard to the effects of rote
attribution and power differentials. It is only in the case of Eichmann that both factors
were ciearly present as Eichmann found himself immersed in a novel, morally
challenging situation exacerbated by the enomious pressure to obey a thoroughly corrupt
manipulative web of authority. Clearly the deeply entrenched imperative for
unconditional obedience embedded within our military and legal systems rendered the
ability of the individual’s implicated, in both the Eichmann case and the prison abuse
scandai, to maintain their moral integrity even more arduous. Nonetheless, it can be
argued that the very nature ofthe positions of importance that these people and many like
them occupied, and continue to occupy, obliges them to possess the faculties required to
decipher the situational traps with which they may potentially be faced. Power, a
fundamentai element of military efficacy, is entrusted to what we hope represents a
responsible, flot readily corruptible, faction of the population. Are we to conclude, as a
resuit of the examples discussed above, that the power placed in the hands of those who
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are expected to protect our nations’ citizens is catastrophically misplaced because the
ability to decipher right from wrong is beyond their capacity? Are we doomed to a life of
inadequate virtue, especially when it counts most?
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Chapter II: The Consequences ofthe Banality ofEvil on Traditional Ethical
Theory
The Situationist Perspective Examined
In sum the type of “immersion into total situations” which took place in the
examples discussed thus far served to transform human behavior so potently so as to put
into question our traditional perceptions of the stability and reliability of individual
morality and virtue. It is precisely in response to these unquestionably disappointing
examples of human ethical potential that the situationists conclude that individual
character does not determine behavior, situation does.
The goal of situationists, such as John Dons and Harman is to bring into question,
what they esteem to be, the traditionally widely held view of character and virtue. In his
article ‘Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics” (199$) Dons suggests that in general “we
believe the person of good character is not easily swayed by circumstance” and we
commonly utilize “normative vocabulary reflecting this ideal (such as) steady,
dependable, steadfast, unwavening, unflinching etc.” Similarly Dons points out that
“when behavior disappoints us we use terms such as weak, fickle, disloyal, unfaithffil,
irresolute etc.”(505) It can be argued that the ethically laden terms that Dons identifies
as deeply entrenched into our vocabulary seem in fact to reflect our, western society’s,
default understanding of virtue. Testimony to the verity of this statement is the
unanimous shock and disgust that has been expressed relative to the Milgram and
Stanford Prison experiments and predominantly the atrocities of Nazi Germany.
Scholars, professionals and lay pensons alike have joined voices in proclaiming the
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abhorrent nature of these events considered unnatural blemishes in the history of
humanity. The intuitive response to such events seems to be one of blaming the
individual characters responsible for the despicable acts. In both the Miigram experiment
and the Stanford Prison Experiment pre study polling, asking a wide range of individuals
to predict the study’s outcome, demonstrated that virtuaiiy ail the respondents held an
optimistic view of the human tendency to behave ethically. Their overwhelmingly
congruent predictions contended that only the rare, emotionally unhealthy, individuais
would behave in a manner that they considered to mn against the predominant ethical
societal norms in which we live. In light of this John Dons seems justified in arguing
that traditionally our “interpretive strategy presupposes that the attribution of a character
trait allows us to predict an individual’s behavior in novel circumstances.”(p.505)
John Dons goes on to say that empirical studies problemetize this traditional
perception of character. In fact expenimental evidence finds that “to put things cmdeiy,
people typically lack character.”(506) This conclusion is flot surprising as Dons draws
from historical events and expenimental studies such as those discussed eanlïer. Dons
argues that undenÏying our traditional conception of virtue are two fundamental
assumptions. first, that there is an association of virtues whereby an individual’s
demonstration of kindness allows us to deduce the existence of related traits such as
consideration and compassion for others. Moreover it presumes the existence of vintues
that are sufficiently resiiient so as to resist contraiy situational pressures. In order to
show empirically the presence ofboth ofthese characteristics argues Doris, there must be
“cross-situational consistency” whereby behavior demonstrating a particular virtuous trait
is present throughout a wide vafiety of situations. In actual fact, argues Doris, studies
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reveal a lack of “cross-situational stability” indicating that “behavior is very oflen
surprisingly unreiiable.”(p. 507)
The poor ethical performance towards which empirical evidence points lias leU
theorists such as Dons to argue the necessity of an alternative, empirically justified, view
of social psycliology; the situationist conception of social psychology. Situationist social
psychology consists of three pivotai themes; “behavioral variation, nature of traits, and
trait organization in personality structure.”(p. 507) The first theme contends that
behavior is flot determined by individual personality but by situational pressures.
Apparently, individual ethical cliaracter does flot serve to distinguish behavior, as Dons
puts it, “to a surprising extent we are safest predicting, for a particular situation, that a
person will behave pretty much as most othens would.”(p. 507) Similarly, the second
situationist theme speaks of the fact that evidence runs contrary to the traditional
mainstream conception of characten traits as being reliable and stable. Acconding to
Dons, any behavioral consistency observed is overridden by situationai variation. The
final theme put forth denies the validity of a conception of moral psychology representing
vii-tues as interrelated.8 More clear]y, evidence shows that an individual who
demonstrates compassion in one situation may readily demonstrate cmelty in another.
The shifi of focus effected by the situationists from the individual character to the
situation as central to moral psychology extends, naturally, into the prescriptive moral
reaim. If ethics is stili concerned with virtuous behavior then, ftom a situationist point of
view, the edification process also shifis focus ftom the individual to the situation. Quite
SThe unitv ofvirtues, against which the situationists argue. is a ftmdamental Socratic pnnciple contending
that a person who is in possession of one virtue will possess them ail. The logic being that underiving
virtue ïs the more fundamental lmowledge of good and bad which, once attained, sen’es as the key to ail
virtue. (Protagoras. 330c, 351d)
Virtue, The fruit ofPhilosophv 34
logically, once we accept the inevitability of “lack of character” there is no where to turn
but the situation. Contrary to a traditional ethical point of view, Situationists consider
“our confidence in character” to be “what puts us at risk in morally dangerous
situations. “(p.51 6) If we rely on our strength of character to assure virtuous behavior in
ethically problematic contexts we are only setting ourselves up for failure. Dons
contends that “ethical reflection is a substantially practical endeavor”(p.512) and
concludes that “reflection on situationism. . . may serve to remind us that, for people like
us, the world is a morally dangerous place.”(p.516) Simply stated, situationists suggest
that in order to avoid unethical behavior we should seek to avoid morally problematic
situations or as Dons puts it “near occasions for sin”.(p.517) Dons qualifies this moral
imperative by suggesting that while it may flot “offer guarantees” it serves to “focus our
ethical attention where it may do the most good”.(p. 517)
Cleanly the examples of ethical degeneration examined thus far serve to validate the
situationist approach. The individuals concerned unequivocally allowed the situation to
determine their behavior, they distorted their previously held ethical principles, if any
such values existed, so as to align them to the demands of the circumstances. Adolf
Eichmann, the Milgram subjects who administered potentially lethal electrical shocks to
innocent victims, the guards in the Stanford Prison Experiment and the military police
and military intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan did unquestionably display a
tremendous Ïack of character. In this respect John Dons does succeed in constmcting a
theory that descnibes a sad and ternifying human shortcoming but does Dons paint the
entire pictune and if he does then what are the consequences of such a depiction of human
ethical behavior?
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Let us attempt to answer the latter portion ofthis question first because, as it turns out,
the answer to the first portion of this question lies therein. Quite starkly stated, if Dons’
theory is correct then our entire ethical system collapses. Gopal Sreenivasan, a critic of
the situationist approach, in his article entitled “Errors about Errors” (2002) recognizes
and questions the serious consequences of arguments such as the ones put forth by Dons.
“If the empirical evidence marshaled by situationism is well-founded, and if its
philosophical advocates are correct, [he writes] the revisions required in our theory of
virtue are stniking indeed
— as they are doubtless meant to be. But are they
warranted?”(p.48) More stnongly stated, if situation tmly dictates behavior then we are
doomed to a sort of situational relativism where no one can be counted on to consistently
do the night thing. If virtuous personality is a myth then there is no guarantee ofvirtuous
action, not even a high probability allowing us to reasonably predict a certain degree of
right action. Moreover, once the nucleus of moral behavior shifis from the individual to
the situation the agent’s understanding ofthe situation becomes dangerously contextuaÏÏy
dependent. One of the risks being that the context is flot necessarily a reliable source of
the potential moral dangers it entails simpÏy because certain situations, precisely those
that are most dangerous, can neither be predicted non avoided. How could Eichmann, for
example, have predicted or avoided the ethicalïy challenging situation with which he was
faced? As a result what prevents us from being reduced to a lying, cheating, cowardly,
and compassionless (as the case of Eichmann suggests) society? Does Dons believe that
we are already there, in a state of moral decay, or does he propose alternative approaches
guaranteeing or at least working towards assuring a minimum degree of virtuous
behavion?
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An affempt to answer this final question reveals perhaps the most serious of ail the
consequences ensuing from the situationist theory. This consequence pertains to their
negligence, in light of their portrayal of humanity as weak, to provide a viable alternative
to the ethical system they serve to undermine. As a resuit they condemn us to definite
ethical failure. If we accept the situationist point ofview put forth by Dons then the only
hope for ethical behavior is, the highÏy questionable ahd improbable, avoidance of
situations considered to provoke potentiaily unethical actions. To begin, this task
presumes that we have the capacity to recognize ethically threatening situations. Which
in tum necessitates that we, virtuously unreliable persons, possess a bank of stable and
universal knowledge as to what constitutes ethical behavior. Moreover it suggests that
we have the strength to act on such knowiedge should we possess it. When examined
from this perspective, the situationist moral philosophy appears to partialÏy align itself to
a traditional conception of morality in so far as it requires the agent to know right from
wrong. Yet it differs from an agent centric moral theory in its distmst of our ability to
put this knowledge into action when actually faced with the morally problematic
situation. In essence, the situationist argument is that knowing what is right is not
sufficient so as to assure right action. Then how can it be sufficient so as to assure the
avoidance of wrong action?
Situationist theory fails terribly in this regard because it, in effect, disarms the victim.
The picture that situationist theory paints, and the tmths that it reveals, should serve to
sound the alarms regarding the potential pitfalls of unanticipated situations and provide
solutions that heÏp arm potential victims against it. Instead, while situationists correctly
identify the moral hurdles inherent in their theory they simply resign themselves to the
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inevitability of human weakness and are content only to caution against the lure of
situational temptation. The effect of which is to further alienate subjects from any
motivation to behave morally, which in effect is the only tool they possess against the
threats brought to light by the situationists. In sum, the princip1 shortfaii of the
situationïsts is their failure to consider seriously the question as to why such behavior
occurs and what can and must be done about it.
Finally, the situationist position seems to reduce ail virtue to the ability to avoid vice
by recognizing that our virtue would flot resist certain contextual demands. Does this
situational deciphering capacity then constitute a virtue in itself? This can not be the case
because of the serious shortcomings that such a quality entails as a drivïng behavioral
force. The principle defect being its failure to elicit right action. While mastering the
ability to recognize morally challenging situations, with the goal of avoiding them, is a
valuable tool, typically, such situations require much more than mere avoidance. They
require the positive act of doing the right thing either for ourselves or for others. Would
it have been sufficient for Eichmann to merely extricate himself from his duties, would
this have quaiified as a virtuous act? It certainly would have been preferable over the
alternative; abdication of ail responsibility and participation in murder, but it would flot
have qualified as virtuous. Doing the right thing most ofien, and clearly in the Eichmann
case requires more than passive abdication, it requires positive ethical conduct.
Eichmann could have arguably used his position to save innocent people whenever
possible, he could have protested the directives of his authorities or he could have sought
another position where sabotage was possible. The Miigram subjects could have
protested the unethical character of the study, they could have tned to help the supposed
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student or protest for the termination of the experiment. Similarly, the “good” guards in
the SPE could have attempted to stop the “bad” guards, efforts to hait the experiment
could have been made or the inappropnate behavior could have been reported to the
proper authorities. Finaiiy, the military police in Abu Ghraib could have notified
superiors ofthe despicable actions being perpetrated, those who stood by and did nothïng
could have tried to heip the victims. The list of actions that would have quaiified as
virtuous is long but the simple act oftuming away from a situation which one recognizes
as morally challenging, as exceeding one’s capacity for virtue, does flot quaiify as one of
them.
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Chapter III: Plato’s Theory of Virtue in 17w Republic
Gyges’ Ring
The idea that virtuous behavior is transient and quite easily derailed lias preoccupied
thinkers for as far back as it is within our capacity to know. The situationists’
conclusions, while disturbing, are not at ail unique. In Plato’s The Repiiblic an argument
which resembles, quite remarkably, that of the situationists is put forth by Glaucon,
Socrates’ interlocutor. To begin Glaucon asks the question that seems to underiie the
contextualist argument; Why should anyone behave ethically if not solely due to the
societal norms which restrict and determine our actions, what, if any, is the inherent
motivation to behave virtuously? In book II of The RepiibÏic, Glaucon restates an
argument (35$e-359b) he holds to have been awkwardly expressed by Tlirasymachus
(33 8b-344c) and inadequately addressed by Socrates9 conceming dikalosuné, or what is,
according to Desmond Lee, commonly translated as justice but more appropriately as
doing right or rnoraÏity.’° In essence, Glaucon argues that justice, or morality, within
Glaucon admits to flot believing in the truth ofTlirasymachus’ position (358c) and therefor considering it
important that Socrates continue, and complete, his refutation of this commonly held erroneous
understanding ofjustice. The necessity that Socrates “convince” lis interlocutors as opposed to simply
“seem to have persuaded” them is Glaucon’s motivation for reiterating Thrsymachus’ argument. (357a-b)
1°Desmond Lee. transiator of The Republic in the Penguin Classics (1984) translates dikaiostmé as ‘doing
right’ at 33 ic but argues, in footnote number one (I). in favour of Cross and Woozley’s contention that
“justice is a thoroughly unsuitable word to use as a translation of the Greek word. Dikaisuné lias a less
legal and more moral meaning tIan ‘justice’ it is in fact the rnost general Greek word for ‘morality’, both
as a personal quality and as issuing in nght action.” (p. 65) The discussion ofjustice which follows seems
to me to support a more genemi understanding of the Greek word dikaiosuné in that it pertains to the just
ordering of the soul required for the artahiment of virtuous dharacter and tIc realisation of a moral life.
Dikaiosuné. the central theme of The Republic, represents human excellence which, for Plato, lies hi the
pursuit, through phiosophy. of the good. In this respect. its meaning goes far beyond the lflgffly legal
understanding associated with the contemporary understanding ofjustice.
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society is the result of societal agreements entered into for mutual convenience but that
given the opportunity evelyone wiÏl behave unethically in order to fiarther his self
interest. He contends that the natural state of man is to behave unjustly as it suits his
purposes but that lie restrains this inclination due to fear of suffering injustice himself. In
other words justice, or morality, is not natural to man, injustice is.
In order to illustrate his argument Glaucon recounts the stoiy of Gyges’ ring (359c-
360b). Gyges, a shepherd in the service of the king, discovers a chasm formed in the
earth as a resuit of a great storm. Upon entering this chasm lie meets with numerous
wonders and riches including a human corpse lying inside a hollow horse. Gyges retreats
ftom the chasm having stolen but one article, a golden ring ftom the finger of the corps
lie encountered. Quite by hazard Gyges discovers that upon tuming the bezel of the ring
towards the inside of his hand lie is rendered invisible. This phenomenon is simply
reversed by retuming the bezel outward. Gyges, intoxicated by lis newly acquired
power, decides to enter the king’ s court wherein lie seduces the queen with whose help lie
murders the king and seizes the throne.
According to Glaucon, Gyges, far ftom representing the dark side of humanity
towards which some, exceptionally evil, individuals are drawn typifies eveiy man ‘s
inherent inclination towards self-serving injustice. As echoed by the contemporary
situationist argument, Gyges, having previously served as a shepherd in the king’s court,
must necessarily have demonstrated a semblance of morality and conformity to societal
norms, as did, once again, the actors in the cases discussed throughout the essay. Yet,
according to Glaucon, the conformity attested to unquestionably represents an artificial
Virtue, The Frtiit ofPhitosophv 41
performance resulting from a contextually imposed morality. Once the situation
permitted for the liberation of the inclinations truÏy innate to human kind Gyges behaved
naturally and as a resuit ttt/ustÏy. Glaucon daims that if two individuals, one having
lived in an apparently just manner and the other having committed injustices, were in
possession of Gyges’ mystical ring both would behave in exactly the same manner;
unethically, motivated entirely by the desire to ffilfil their base pleasures and unruly
ambitions. Virtuous character traits demonstrated under conventional circumstances,
being unnatural to the agents, will not transcend the limits of the situation that imposed
them originally. Neither the saint nor the criminal will behave justly ofhis own free will.
Neither one would withstand the temptation to gain wealth, physical pleasures or great
power were they afforded the means to acquire such gifis without fear of reprisal; “what a
person with a seemingly ideal moral character will do in a particular situation is pretty
much what anyone else will do in exactly that situation.” This statement, quite
astoundingly, is not spoken by Glaucon but can be found in the writings of situationist
theorist Gilbert Harman.1’ Moreover, it resonates with remarkable similarity in the
writings of John Dons where he contends that “we are safest predicting, for a particular
situation, that a person will behave pretty much as most others would.”(p.507)12 In sum,
ancient and contemporary theories converge practically verbatim, to argue against the
This quotation is excerpted ftom a short essay found on Gilbert Harman’s website on August 18, 1999.
12 is interesting to note that this theme is also deeply entrenched in contemporary pop culture in the form
of superhero personas. Superhero characters, such as spiderman superman and batman, for example. who
have been endowed with superlumun powers, are deemed heroic due to their will to use their power for
good as opposed to evïl. This, in fact, is what differentiates them from their archenenues who, possessing
similarly unique gifis. employ them to further their malevolent and sefflsh goals.
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prevalence of human virtue as an end in itself, when stripped of the societal honors and
rewards that render it desirable.
The Repu btic on Justice (dikaiosuné)
Glaucon’s question as to whether or flot Gyges represents every man’s situationally
dependent ethical character preoccupies Socrates throughout the remainder of The
Repubtic. As the dialogue progresses Plato reveals an ethical philosophy that seeks to
explain the undeniably dismal moral behavior witnessed empirically by situationists and
ancients alike. To begin, in keeping with the ingenious thematic consistency of Platonic
writings, the method that Socrates employs in developing his argument echoes its
content. Throughout The Repubtic Socrates uses the dialectic method of investigation in
order to bring to light the intrinsic value of moral conduct as well as to explain its
absence. As will be discussed later in the essay, the nature ofthe diatectic is transformed
as the dialogue progresses from an interactive (refittative) mode, characteristic of Plato’ s
earlier writings, to what will be described as a soii/wy method.’3 In general the diaiectic
consists principally of discussion the aim of which is to clarify the subject, usually
concerning moraÏity, under examination. The discussion, predominantly in the earlier
portion of The Repubtic, takes the form of a diatecticat refiutation (éÏegkhos) consisting of
cross-questioning wherein the interlocutors ask and attempt to answer probing questions
13Later in t..he essay I discuss the transformation of the diatectic from its classically refutative nature, being
exposed at present, typical ofPlato’s earlier dialogues, consisting principally of an instructive, ofien
edifyïng, discourse between two interlocutors. to what will be descnbed as a sotitary and internai dialogue.
I will argue that the latter forrn of the diatedllc, typffied by the absence of interlocutors and consequently
argumentation, does flot represent a schism with the earlîer form but a progression that corresponds to the
ascension from the tangible (refutalive diatectic) and intelligible (sotitarv dialectic) reahns ofknowledge.
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so as to unravel mistaken preconceptions and, in the process, reveal, and maintain, the
ideas whose validity withstands ail examination.
The diatecticul refittation is not only the method but also the embodiment of Socrates’
principle preoccupation; the pursuit of tmth especiaily as it regards questions of virtue.
Nowhere is the unity between the artisan and his crafi better illustrated than in the
ApoÏogy where the Oracle at Delphi proclaims that there is no man wiser than
Socrates.(21a) Socrates, in keeping with his proclamation of ignorance, is perplexed by
the Oracle’s daim and sets out to find one who is wiser than he.(21b-c) This very quest
mimics the nature of the diaÏectic, strictly speaking, in so far as it represents a series of
refitiations, each ofwhich peels off a layer of false knowledge, leading Socrates doser to
a very important truth about himself. Towards this end he seeks out those most highly
respected for their wisdom especially as it pertains to ethical questions. Upon engaging
in discussions with them in the traditional diatectic method he discovers that his
interlocutors’ lack the ffindamental prerequisite for wisdom; the readiness to void their
minds of mistaken opinions through the awareness oftheir own ignorance.(21d) The said
wisest men in Greece hold opinions that they have neyer truÏy questioned and, as a resuit,
the validity of which has neyer been proven. Socrates’ questioning reveals that the
supposed knowledge held by his interlocutors does not hold up to profound reflection. In
an interesting twist Socrates is forced to acquiesce to the accuracy of the Oracle’s daim
while simultaneously maintaining his daim of ignorance. Socrates contends that his
quest has in fact demonstrated that no one is wiser than he is yet his wisdom consists of
the absence of false knowledge, which is none other than the child of éiegkhos.
Ironically, Socrates’ wisdom lies in the knowledge of his ignorance and in this way he is
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the embodiment ofthe dialectic method he employs. The degree to which the practice of
éiegkhos is essential to Socrates is clearly indicated in the Apo/ogy where Socrates
contends that “The unexamined life is flot worth living for men.”(3$a) Finally, while
Socrates neyer professes to possess full knowledge that he can impart directly it is
nonetheless knowledge to which he arrives when the cloud of opinion is lifted. Yet is
such knowledge incongruous with the Socratic daim of ignorance? Not necessarily
because this understanding ofknowtedge is in no way absolute which, it can be argued, is
the definition of knowledge against which Socrates stands. It would flot be inconsistent
with Platonic writings to assert that the Socratic conception of wisdom and ignorance is
conceived so as to avoid the dangers resulting from the cessation of questioning which
unfortunately ofien coincide with the proclamation of knowledge. As a resuit Socrates’
daim of ignorance may be said to represent a dynamic understanding of knowledge
wherein a state of knowing is neyer ffilly achieved, at least not by mortals. Ultimately,
the perpetual diaÏectic is the human form ofknowledge.
Élegkhos is uniquely qualifled to help answer the question that is central to this
examination, namely, why is justice, or morality, desirable as an end in itself and how
can its attainment be assured. In The Republic Socrates contends that this question is too
difficuit to respond to on the level of the individual and that it must be addressed on a
societal level first and eventually scaled down and answered relative to the individual.
For Socrates, justice, understood globally as morality, is defined more precisely as the
ordering ofthe human soul. Following the tripartide depiction ofjustice on a communal
scale Socrates portrays individual justice, in much the same way, as consisting of the
harmonious interaction between the three elements of the soul (psuché); reason, desire
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and spirit, thurnos. Justice occurs when each element is performing its proper function.
Reason represents the faculty that calculates and decides permitting understanding, weii
thought out action, foresight and wisdom in general. Desire or appetite depicts the
human capacity for bare physical instinctive craving. Finally, thurnos describes our
pugnacity, the enterprising and ambitious elements of our being, in sum our spirit. When
each facuity performs the function that is proper to it then reason naturally dominates
over the whole. The degree to which one develops the facuity of reason, through
intellectual and physical training, will determine their ability to achieve internai harmony
and consequently elevate the quality of the psuché. Thurnos, if its powers are
appropriately channeled, through harmony and rhythm, serves to support reason in the
execution of its objectives. Finaily reason and thurnos must work together to harness the
fundamental physical desires that are inherent to human survival so as to prevent them
from growing out ofcontroi and overpowering the other faculties.
The act of keeping the three elements of the psuché “in tune”(443d) is a crucial
concept for Plato in so far as it represents the seif-mastering necessary for a just, or
moral, existence. A mmd that is mled by its ambitions or its desires will be swayed off
track in its pursuit ofright conduct. Internai justice, as Socrates describes it, provides the
wisdom required for just action when confronted with circumstances of any kind.
Socrates eloquently expresses this argument where he writes,
“when (one) has bound these elements into a disciplined and harmonious
whole, and so become ffilly one instead of many, he will be ready for
action of any kind, whether it is political or private; and he will reckon and
cail any ofthese actions just and honorable if it contnbutes to and helps to
maintain this disposition of mmd, and will cail the knowledge which
controls such action wisdom.”(443e)
Virtue, The Frttit ofPhilosophv 46
More fundamentalÏy, for Plato the just ordenng of the human sou! is the zenith of human
excellence. When one leads a just, morally correct, life he is realizing the excellence
towards which he naturally tends. The pursuit of human excellence, understood in this
way, is the unique path to absolute happiness. Happiness, the unrelenting pursuit of
which, culminates with the perception of tue good. Plato holds tue good to be the
summum bonum of human existence, the apex towards which the just sou! strives. The
acquisition ofwhich represents the sublime motivation ofour eternal joumey.
As is becoming increasingiy clear, for Plato, as expressed through Socrates, virtue is
intimately linked to knowledge. The just ordering of the sou!, which is the prerequisite
for virtue, is wholly dependent upon reason’ s capacity to reign over ail other constituents
of the psuché. In order for the mastering of reason to result in virtue the underlying
principle espoused by Plato must necessarily be that knowing what is right will
undoubtedly coincide with right action. Clearly if this were flot the case then Plato’s
definition of justice would fall short as regards virtuous behavior since it would be
possible to consistently know what is right but to be lured by various desires into
unethical practices. Instead, Plato eliminates the possibility of akrasia by depicting the
capacity of self-mastering as inherent to reason’s excellence. As a result, in The ReptcbÏic
Plato portrays justice as the reaim within which reason and lack of virtue cannot coincide.
In the Protagoras Plato illustrates his powerful conception of knowledge as both a
necessary and sufficient condition for virtue where he writes the following;
“In sum the idea that we develop of knowledge is one of a slave tossed
about in all directions by one thousand wills. Is this also your opinion on
knowledge? Or on the contrary do you sec in it a beautiful thing, able to
dictate to man, in such a way that he who knows the good and the bad will
refuse invincibly to do anything agaÏnst the prescriptions of knowledge
and that wisdom be for man a sure support? [Protagoras]: 1 agree with you
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Socrates and I add that I wouid be more ashamed than anyone to refuse to
sec in knowledge and wisdom the greatest ofliuman strengths.(352b-d)’4
In this way Plato sought to eliminate the arbitrariness typically attached by his
contemporaries, and clearly ours as weil, to morality. Plato believed, contrary to the
prevalent opinion of his time, that human virtue was dependent only on knowledge, as
was the case with ail other tekhnê, or techniques, which obeyed a set of mies that could
be codified and subsequentïy imparted to others. He reffised to succumb to daims that
virtue, which he considered to be the most profound human preoccupation, was less
reliable a pursuit than pottery, for example. An artisan possessing the right knowledge of
pottery making, if he applies this knowledge, arrives at his desired resuit; the creation of
poilely.’5 Yet, as pertains to virtue most would argue that one who knows what is right
‘ As will become increasingly evident, the position espoused throughout the essay. relative to the topic of
akrasia. mus contraly to the standard view maintained at present by contemporaly scholars. This
“prevalent view” as it is referred to by Gabnela Carone in her article “Akrasia in the Repub lie: Does Plato
Change his Mmd?” identifies a division between, what is considered to be, the Socratic conception of
akrasia, represented in the Protagoras, and the differing Platonic understanding ofthis theme as developed
in The Repubtic. The generally accepted position, in a nutshell. is (bat, unlike Socrates who neyer admits to
die possibility of akrasia, Plato does acknowledge the human capacitv to know the good and choose flot to
embrace it. ibis point ofview is based principally upon two key (bernes found in book four of The
Republic, first, Plato’s tripartite division ofthe soul (435a-443c) winch is said to allow for internai coiifiict
between reason and appetite. and second, the story ofLeontius (439e-440a), entailed within Socrates’
discussion of individual justice. esteemed to acknowledge the power of base desires over reason.
Fortunately, I am not alone in die refusai to acknowledge a rifi between the Socratic and Platonic
conceptions of akrasia. In the above mentioned article. Gabnela Carone aiso argues, quite convincingly, in
favour of thematic umtv between the Protagoras and The Repubtic relative to the topic of akrasia. She
argues (bat “Plato’s position in the Republic does flot need to, and indeed should not. be read as a departare
from die earlier, Socratic view. Plato’s position in the Reptiblic, tshe contendsj, is flot only consistent witl;
Socrates’ denial of akrasia in the Protagoras, but can also be seen as a continuation and elaboration of
vanous Socratic theses.”(p. 108-109) And later in her conclusion she stipulates (bat “It remains as
unquestionable in the Republic as in the Protagoras (bat the presence ofknowledge in the soul would be
incompatible with any psychic conflict and (bus with any ldnd of ak-rasia.”(p. 144) Similarlv, throughout
the course of the present exegesis there is an attempt to indicate. whenever deemed appropnate, the
thernatic consistency regarding the question of akrasia between the earlier, termed. Socratic dialogues and
the latter dialogues of winch The Repubtic is representative.
15 In Lesser Hippias Socrates appears to argue in favour of a position (bat is diametrically opposed to the
one presented here, (bat is, the impossibility of akrasia. In titis short dialogue Piato, quite curiously. not
only recognises die possibility of akrasia but daims that one who conmiits injustice voluntarily is a “better
person” (ban one whose inirnomhty resuits from ignorance. The prrnciple objective of The Repub tic is to
show that justice must and witt inevitably reigu over injustice in die hurnan sou! as welÏ as die polis when
reason takes its righfful place at die helm of die sou!. Titis understanding ofjustice can not allow for die
possibility that “those who harm people and commit injustice and lie and cheat and go wrong voluntarily,
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will flot reliably do what is right, or as the situationists so aptly daim, most people tend
to demonstrate a lack ofeharacter.
Consequently, it is in light of Plato’s theory of virtue science that the degree of
importance of the dialectic becomes ftully apparent. If virtuous action, which is the only
means by which tme happiness is achieved, is directly dependent on the unencumbered
knowledge of the good and the diatectic is, according to Socrates, the privileged path to
wisdom then the diaÏectic is a prerequisite for virtue. The diaiectic is in this sense the
foundation ofvirtue without which happiness can flot be achieved. If right knowledge
radier than involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily.”(372d) This amounts to the
Platonic conception of excellence being turned upside down where excellence includes excellent badness
and cannot be understood as representing what Socrates “tajly believes”. In fact, at the end of the dialogue
both Socrates and Hippias admit as much, that is. to not accepting die truth of this assertion. Hippias says
“I can’t agree with you in that, Socrates.”(372d) To which Socrates responds “[n]or I with myseif. Hippias.
But given die argument, ive can’t help having it look that way to us. now, at any rate. However, as I said
before. on diese mallers I wavcr back and forth and neyer believe die same thing. Md it is not surprising
that I or any other ordinary person shouÏd waver. But if you wise men are gomg to do it too that means
something terrible for us, if we can’t stop our wavering even afier we’ve put ourselves in vour
cornpany.”(376c) The position which Socrates appears to defend in dis dialogue is, in fact, anti-Socratic.
As a result. if its authenticity is to be acknowledge& die hidden Socratic meaning, underlying Ibis
exchange. must be sought out. While an in depth analysis ofthis meaning is beyond die scope ofthis
essay. a prehminary hypothesis may be that Socrates seeks to demonstrate. through example, die
inadequacy of rhetoric, die monologistical tool of a sophist such as Hippias, as compared to éÏegkhos to
bring about virtue. To begin, Socrates admits to defending a position in which he does flot believe. a
practice typical of rhetonc. thus brealting die first mie of elenctic discussion. (Gorgias 495a, Protagoras
33 Ic, Cntias 49c-d) Moreover, Socrates also admits, sited above. diat his argument is not necessarily
concemed widi what is true but only that winch seems to be true as is, once agahi, die pnnciple
preoccupation of the sophists, completely undermining die goal of the philosopher. Also in die above
passage, Socrates descnbes himself and Hippias as wavering which, as we are told in Gorgias, is a
“shameful thing for us, being in die condition we appear to be in at present
— when we neyer thhik die sanie
about die same subjects, die most important ones at dat — to sound off as though we’re somebodies.”(527d)
It is flot possible to accept that Socrates contented himself with wavering regarding questions dat affected
de well being of the soul. Instead Socrates must be understood as demonstraung to Hippias that oration
diat does flot propagate die trudi is futile. Hippias’ refusai, to die end, to concede to Socrates fluiher
supports this argument because it forces Hippias to acimowledge diat die appearance of truth is
meaningless, even dangerous, as regards questions ofvirtue. k serves to propagate Socrates’ avowal in
Gorgias “that oratory and every other activity is aiways to be used in support of what’s just.”(527c)
Anodier crucial indicator that Socrates seeks. in this dialogue. to confront rhetonc with élegkhos is that
neidier one of the interlocutors is refute no one is convinced by die arguments put forth which we know is
of primordial importance to Socrates.(Gorgias 474a-b, 475e-476a) Ultimately. Hippias. with alt ofhis
knowtedge, is shown incapable of arriving at die truth by use of lis rhetoncal talents. It would seem dat
Socrates also tvïshes to show die limitations of Hippias’s luiowledge, of winch lie is so confident, ivith die
goal of persuading him to use lus talents so as 10 improve the condition of the souls of lis audiences
through de pursuit and dissemination of truth.
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translates directly into right action, free of intermediaries, then virtue is secondary to
knowledge It is secondary in the sense that it is entirely dependent upon the acquisition
of knowledge without which it cannot be realized. True virtue void of knowledge is an
impossibility for Plato whereas knowledge does flot depend upon virtue for its substance.
The dialectical process renders intellectual enlightenment possible without which
knowledge and virtue can flot see the light of day.
A contemporary theorist, Joel Kupperman, in his article entitled “The Indispensability
of Character” (2001) develops a Platonic inspired ethical theory whose ffindamental
principles, which echo the theoiy of justice presented above, provide a modem
interpretation of the ancient perspective. Kupperman argues that most contemporary
ethical philosophers make a mistakenly sharp distinction between the study of morality
and axiology or the examination of the quality of one’s goals and values. He suggests
that the goals and values of a person of strong moral character will differ greatly from
those of a person of questionable moral character, as will their respective interpretations
of morally problematic situations. This implies that ethical behavior is interactive, that is,
that it depends upon the appropriate evaluation of the situation as well as the knowledge
and volition to act well. Clearly one’s evaluation of any ethically challenging situation
cails upon the entirety of their virtue laden experiences. This resembles Socrates’
description of justice in that it depicts ethical choice as consisting of more than merely
choosing from a list of moral dictums when faced with ethical quandaries. Tnstead, for
Socrates, virtuous action results from the acquisition of right knowledge resulting from
internaI balance. In contemporary terms this intemnal balance may be seen as representing
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that which Kupperman describes as the projects and life pursuits that one considers
meaningful.
In an earlier article, “Character and Self-Knowledge” (1985), Kupperman, once
again recails the rational conception of morality articulated above from a modem
perspective. In diametrical opposition to the situationist argument against the reliability
of character traits, he develops a character centric ethical philosophy. Kupperman
develops a holistic conception of character, which can be summed up as follows; self
knowledge is a rational exercise whereby past experiences translate into our ability to
anticipate future behavior with an acceptable degree of reliability. Character, the thread
that enables the continuity between past and present behavior, requires the rational
volition for what Kupperman terms “self-ratification”. He uses the term “self
ratification” to describe the intellectual decision to continue to pursue thoughts and
actions that manifest one’s character. In other words, the reliable prediction of future
behavior depends on the conscious development and sustainment of one’s character, a
phenomenon that has regrettably been overlooked in contemporary society according to
Kupperman. In this way he seeks to revitalize the ancient tmism, clearly evident in the
theory ofjustice developed in The Republic and refuted by the situationists, “that virtuous
choice (arises) from good character.”(p. 219) Kupperman quotes from Hume’s Leatise
of Humati Nature so as to demonstrate an example of the “suwival” of the ancient
perspective that he takes up; “If any action be either virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only as a
sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mmd,
which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character.”(p. 219)
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The Republic on Character (euèthelit)
Throughout The Republic Plato employs the term Characier fruèthela,) to signify
one’s essence, the kind 0fpeion one truly is. As will be shown in the discussion that
follows, the seemingly Aristotelian position that euètheia is the resuit of habit adopted in
the Laws (792e-e), is flot at ail supported in the depiction of euètheia found in The
RepubÏic. Moreover, an Aristotelian understanding of enèthela would mn contraly to the
prominent theme of Tue Republic, which represents the principle focus of the present
exegesis, that virtue ensuing ftom habit and custom, as opposed to phiiosophy, resuits in
the illusion of virtue and devastating life choices as illustrated by the case of the fallen
soul, discussed at greater length later in the essay, who mistakenly chose the tormented
future life of a monstrous tyrant.(6 19h-e) In The Republic, euètheia corresponds to the
quality of a person’s soul, the degree to which it is one within itse(f in so far as it
possesses internaI harmony; dikaiosuné. Tt is in this respect that Plato sets the stage for
Kupperman’s revival of the contention that quality of characier does in fact determine
the degree of virtue one manifests throughout one’ s life.
As wiii become evident, this conception of euèthela is central to, and consequently
developed in conjunction with, Flic Repubiic ‘s educationai agenda. Plato introduces the
concept of euètheia eariy on in The Republic at the onset of his discussion concerning the
education ofthe phulakes, or guardians, where he asks the following question; “where are
we to find a character that is both gentie and high spirited at the same time?” (3 75e) This
prologue is significant in that it relates character (euètheia), from the onset, to what
amounts to the precursor of the internai mechanics of the tripartide soul. Plato’s
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philosopher rulers wiii achieve the rare balance between genlleness and high spirifedness
when they acquire the internai harmony ofthe soul, discussed above, that is justice.
Stili within the context of appropriate moral education, several of Plato’s ensuing
mentions of euèthe/a (400d, 400e, 40La and 401b) occur in relation to the reciprocal
dynamic between euètheja and external influences or, more generally, environment,
specifically as it pertains to the arts; literature, poetry and music. Contrary to the
common misconception surrounding Plato’s disdain for ail such crafis, the above
mentioned passages, representing but a few, point to Plato’s high regard for the enormous
potential benefits of what he esteems to be powerful sources of influence on euètheia.
He makes this abundantly clear where he writes, “rhythm and harmony permeate the
inner parts of the soul more than anything else”.(401d) It is precisely due to Plato’s
acknowiedgment of the important impact that music and poetry bear on the developing
souls ofthe philosopher rulers, positive or negative depending on the quality ofthe craft,
that lie insists on the necessity of rigid controls over these arts when used in education.
More precisely, if music and poetiy, for example, are to benefit the guardian’s mmd they
must begin by reflecting the traits that they intend to inspire. A goal that can only be
accomplished, according to Plato, when the arts in question are modeled afier people who
already possess the traits or characteristics desired. For example, in order to find
moderation in the “regulation of meter”... “we shouldn’t strive to have either subtlety or
great variety in meter. Rather, we should tly to discover what are the rhythms of
someone who leads an ordered and courageous Ïife and then adapt the meter and the tune
to lis words, flot his words to them.”(399e-400a) Plato pursues this line of reasoning as
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pertains to the content ofthe words that are to accompany the harmony and rhythm ofthe
music where he writes the following;
“ffirther, if, as we said just now, rhythm and mode must conform to the
words and flot vice versa, then good rhythm follows fine words and is
similar to them, while bad rhythm follows the opposite kind of words, and
the same for harmony and disharmony. [AdeimantusJ: To be sure, these
things must conform to the words. What about the style and content ofthe
words themselves? Don’t they conform to the character of the speaker’s
soul? [Adeimantus]: 0f course. And the rest conform to the words?
[Adeimantus]: Yes.(400d)
Once again ezièthela is mentioned in association with the state of the soul which points
directly to the degree of justice acquired. These passages, which precede Plato’s overt
representation of justice, while flot containing specific references to dikaiosuné
nonetheless point to the principle elements of what will soon be revealed as Plato’s
theory ofjustice; moderation, order, harmony and courage.
A few lines later Plato’s conception of character as the vessel of justice is further
confirmed and elaborated upon as mention is made of the final, primordial element of
justice; intelligence, reason. Plato writes, “fine words, harmony, grace, and rhythm
follow simplicity of character-and I do flot mean this in the sense in which we use
‘simplicity’ as a eupliemism for ‘simple-mindedness’-but I mean the sort of fine and
good character that has developed in accordance with an intelligent plan.”(400d-e) The
interpretation ofPlato’s conception of euètheia being developed here, and throughout the
essay, is supported by Georges Leroux in his recent translation of La République (2004)
where lie writes, in reference to the preceding passage, “Platon s’empresse de préciser
qu’il entend par là (euètheéa, e!) le caractère comme support de la vertu, c’est-à-dire la
réflexion dirigée vers le beau et le bien, et non la simple habitude, l’absence de
réflexion.”(p. 581) Moreover, following Plato’s overt exposition of the essence of
r”irtue, The Fruit ofPhilosophv 54
justice, euèthela is directly linked to justice as the vehicle by which justice manifests
itself in virtuous action. In response to Adeimantus’ contention that in actual practice
philosopher’s are either useless or dangerous(4$7c-d) Socrates, having addressed the
question of their utility, contends that the genuine philosopher, an erotic lover of truth,
cannot possibly engender evit which is its opposite.(490c) Instead, the lover of truth
possesses “a healthy and just character”... consisting of”courage, high-mindedness, ease
in learning and good memory”... “with moderation following it.”(490c) Nonetheless,
concedes Plato, the accusation that his contemporary, so called philosophers, pose a
danger to society is in fact justified in so far as they are imposters who misrepresent
themselves as phïÏosophers and consequently cause more harm that good. The
fundamental problem, argues Plato, lies in the inability of the profoundly corrupt state of
the Greek constitution, the purification ofwhich is among the principle preoccupations of
The Republic, to provide “appropriate instruction” for the philosophical nature.(492) As
a resuit, the conception of euètheia that Plato is developing appears to be dual consisting
of the fundamental nature of the person which is acted upon, or influenced, by the
instruction that it receives, thus the great emphasis in The RepubÏic on the proper
education ofthe philosopher rulers. A conception that is consistent with his portrayal of
justice as resulting from the continuous embellishment of one’s natural tendencies
towards excellence that accompanies the acquisition of right knowledge. Plato clearly
articulates the important and multi faceted relationship between character and education
where he writes,
“there isn’t now, hasn’t been in the past, nor ever will be in the future
anyone with a character so unusual that he has been educated to virtue in
spite of the contrary education he received from the mob-I mean, a human
character; the divine, as the saying goes, is an exception to the rule. You
Virtue, The fruit ofPhilosophv 55
should realize that if anyone is saved and becomes what he ought to be
under our present constitutions, he has been saved-you might rightly say—
by divine dispensation.”(492e)
It does flot require tremendous extrapolation to decipher the reference here to Socrates
who ofien defers his insight to divine intervention. A supposition which is directly
confirmed where Socrates contends that, in contrast to men who pretend to be
philosophers while only preaching “sophisms” or the falsities proliferated by the “mob”,
“there remains. . only a very small group who consort with philosophy in a
way that’s worthy of her: A noble and well brought up character, for
example, kept down by exile, who remains with philosophy according to
his nature because there is no one to corrupt him, or. . . my own case is
hardly worth mentioning-my daemonic sign-because it happened to no one
before me, or to only a very few.”(496a-c)
The importance of education on euètheja for Plato cannot be overemphasized. A
philosophic nature immersed in an unhealthy environment flot only “fails to develop its
full power” but “declines into a different character.”(497b) Plato believes that when
potentially noble natures are “destroyed” in this manner the results are particularly
negative because great evil, like great good, does not result from ordinary natures but
from vigorous ones.(491e) “But”, explains Plato, “if it were to find the best constitution,
as it is itself the best, it would be clear that it is really divine and that the other natures
and ways of life are merely human.”(497c) This, of course, sums up the philosopher
ruler’s objective; to instill the order and divinity that he personifies into “people’s
characters, whether into a single person or into a populace”.(500d) Euètheia becomes, for
Plato, synonymous to the essence of the person which is determined flot by natural
tendencïes alone but by the entity that emerges when education and nature converge. The
philosopher ruler’s role as a crafisman who educates “human character” by divine
inspiration lends the concept of enèthela primordial status in The Republic in that it is
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upon the quality of the citizens’ characters that the caliber of the constitution
depends. (501 a) Plato writes “there are as many forms of Immun churucter as there are of
constitutions.. .[since constitutions are boni] from the characters ofthe people who live in
the cities governed by them”.(544e) Consequently, where Plato goes on to say that “if
there arefiveforms of city, there must also befiveforms of the individnaÏ souf’ his use of
the terms character and sont interchangeably resuits in the equation of human character
to the individual sou! of which the former is a vessel.(544e) Plato’s final references to
eztètheia coincide with his description ofthe constitutions that he deems to be inadequate.
He describes the progressive deterioration of each constitution, a!ong with the defining
characters of its constituents, into an inferior society in terms of a progressive
relinquishing ofcontrol to the inferior echelons ofthe soul. Once again, as has been seen
throughout The Repubiic, deterioration resuits flot from knowing what is good and
choosing to embrace the bad, akrasia, but from inappropriate education that fails to bring
about profound knowledge of the tmth.’6 Reason is to the individual characters what the
phulakes are to the constitutions; P!ato describes the decline of a man with an aristocratic
character as resuhing from a lack of purity
“in his attitude to virtue. . . because he lacks the best guardians. . . reason”(549b), and later
16 Gabnela Carone evokes a similar argument in lier article ‘4krasia in the Repubtic:Does Ptato Change bis
Mmd?” in response to the “prevalent view” of contemporary scholars relative to the topic of akrasia which
daims that “desire has a strength which is independent ofthe strength ofreason and the degree ofthe
agent’s ex-pected good.” As proofofthe contention that it is reason’s strcngth that determines what
proportions desfre will take. Ms Carone directs us to Plato’s insistence that “double standards imposed on
die timocratic youth, who hears different stones about what things should be honoured and valued, have the
effect of causing him internai slruggie (8. 549 C-5 50 B) and that bad %éyot, imparfing false beliefs on
children and adults. can cause die strengthening of one’s lower desfres (10. 605 A-C, 606 A-E cf. 2. 391 E-
392 A) as in the case ofmimetic poetrv, which presents as ‘ail nght’ to the audience characters and actions
which are not. [According to Ms. Caronej This suggests that the parficular beliefs the agent adopts about
what is good do have an effect on the strength of lier desfre: il is partly on these grounds that Plato
recommends thatonly hnms to die gods and eulogies to good characters should be adimtted as poetry into
bis city (10, 607 A 3-5, cf. 3, 401 D, 410 C).”(p. 128)
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“knowledge, fine ways of living, and words of truth. are the best watchmen and
guardians ofthe thoughts ofthose men whom the gods love”.(560b)17
In sum, the central theme of ettèthefa spans the entire length of The Reptibtic. Its
development appropriately coincides with the dialogue’s advancement of the theory of
virtue for which euètheia is, as has been shown, a vessel that at once supports and reflects
its content, virtue, which, in turn, defines and substantiates it. As a resuit, the Platonic
conception of euètheia as put forth in The Republic, like virtue, cannot resuit from habit
and custom but must necessarily stem from philosophical reflection. Moreover, every
possible measure must be taken so as to assure that virtuous character be nurtured and
encouraged by extemal influences incorporating the principles that resuit from such
reflection. Good character, understood from this perspective, is therefor the overt
expression ofthe human excellence that is virtue.
17 Once again. Gabriela Carone, in the article sited in the previous footnote. supports this interpretatÏon
where she writes. “the text at other places indicates that Ptato is far from allotting appetites a strength
which is independent ofthe strength ofreason’s own desfre. Thus. in Repubtic 6 the proper channelling of
love towards imowledge and truth lias the effect of weakening ail other desires (485 A-E, cf
ao-OEv6oTepat at D 7); simflarly. in the money-or honour- loving person. their strong love for their main
target weakens thefr love for learning truth and philosophy.”(p. 129) Later in the article, shc elaborates
upon her conviction that Plato does flot abandon the understanding of akrasia put forth in the Protagoras,
by referring specffically to Plato’ s comparison between the polis and the individual. as I have donc in this
passage, as pointing to mistaken beliefs and underdeveloped reason, flot akrasia, as msponsïble for the
deteriomtion in character obsewed. She writes. “in view of Plato’s parallel between the polis and the
individual. the money-loving and licentious human types must also possess beliefs about what is good. But
certainly in these cases, die soul is confùsed as stated at 6, 505 D-E. and as we also find in books 8 and 9
with respect to those human types where the proper goals of reason no longer predominate. Thus for
example. the appetites of the democratic mati. which have grown strong because of ignorant upbringing and
bad company. sec his aicpéiroÀts empty of knotvledge and tmth and finally take it over with false beliefs
(8, 560 A-C). The most pitifiul case is the tvrannical soin. which is ‘full of turmoil min regret’. being
insatiable (9. 577 D-57$ A. Reason within it lias become weak (cf. auO6i’z7. 589 A) and is ‘draggcd
about’ (sÂ.Krcrûat) by the other parts (ibid.).”(p. 135-136)
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The Theory of Forms
Underlying the rational depiction of human psychology and the conesponding
conception of character exposed above is, undeniably, Plato’s theory of forms. While an
in depth discussion of the hallowed theory of forms is clearly beyond the scope of this
essay, it is important to underline the crucial role that this concept plays in Plato’s ethical
philosophy as weli as to address its implications relative to the discussion at hand. To
begin, Plato’s insistence on the supremacy of reason over habit and custom as the
inevitable path to vii-tue, in so far as knowledge of the good will necessarily lead to right
action, can only be ffihly appreciated when understood relative to one of the defining
principles of his philosophy; the forms. As a result, this pivotai theory serves to flirther
unite and elaborate upon the central themes discussed throughout the essay by elucidating
the relationship between the tangible domain, our physical world, and the intangible
reaim ofthe intelligible wherein reside the forms and their summit, theforrn ojîhe good
Moreover, as will become evident, Plato discusses the forms principally in relation to the
education of the philosopher miers wherein he cautions that only very few will possess
the rare combination of qualities required so as to attain this knowledge.(503b) This line
of reasoning begs the question, to be discussed below, as to whether or flot Plato’s
exclusivity serves, ironically, to support the situationists’ argument by rendering virtue
unattainabie except for an extraordinary few. Finally, the unverifiable and metaphysical
nature of Plato’s theoiy of forms will be put into question in so far as it allows for
skepticism as to the very existence ofthe forms and, or, their capacity to be known. The
consequence of which is to put into question the very attainability of virtue, that is, if the
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forms, so firndamental to virtue, do flot exist or if they can flot be known then is virtue
unattainable?
b begin, in The Repithiic, the notion of form or eidos is, summarily, described as the
objective of knowledge in so far as it represents the tnith towards which the
philosopher’s mmd naturally tends. This truth, is situated beyond the physical reaim and
can only be perceived intellectually, through contemplation. There is an eidos, or form,
idea or patter for eveiy tangible element that represents what each thing truly is and in
which each thing partakes (nieïechein), but is flot to be confused with, and from which it
gains the minimal degree of reaÏity attainable in the physicai world. Plato elevates the
concept of eidos to yet a higher level with the notion of the jorrn of the good. In the sun
simile (507a-509c) Plato seeks to illustrate, through a comparative exegesis whereby the
Jorrn of the good is likened to the sun, this crucial concept representing the ultimate
echelon of human knowledge and consequently the essence of human excellence. The
forrn of the good may be described as the eldos of the eidos in so far as it is “by their
relation to it {the form of the good] that just things and the others become useful and
beneficial.”(505a) More clearly, Plato argues that the possession of any knowledge
without knowledge of the forni of the good is necessarily incomplete in that it lacks the
goodness essential to the object of knowledge. Finally, once apprehended, the verity of
the eldos and ultimately the eidos oJthe good is immediately visible and, as a result, ail
activity in the physical reaim will, by necessity, be guided by its principles. The fact that
this conception of eidos is at the foot ofPlato’s theories of justice, character and virtue is
self-evident. Right action, or justice, is guided by reason which seeks the eidos in ail
things especially as regards ail ethical questions. As a resuit, justice ensues when reason
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seeks and apprehends the fruth that exists beyond the illusions of fruth that resuit from
the acceptance of commonly held opinions and beliefs which are flot the fruit of
phiiosophy, or profound reflection. The forms, as the sole, supreme and infallible objects
of knowledge, ffirther render virtue that resuÏts from mere habit or custom illusory as
their appearance in Platonic philosophy assures that true virtue is necessarily the product
of the Ïifelong quest for knowledge and, more precisely, knowledge of the Jorrn of the
good.
In The RepubÏic the attribution of the capacity to acquire this knowledge is highly
elitist. li is largely attributed to the philosopher mlers and is said to be possible only for a
highly gified few. Plato explains this by stipulating that the philosopher (phiÏosophos)
must embody a combination of traits that are only rarely present at once in a single
constitution. Socrates argues that individuals who possess qualities such as “ease of
learning, good memory, quick wits, smartness, youthful passion, [and) high
mindedness”(503c) will not easily lead the stable and orderly life required of the
phitosophos. While, on the contrary, those who possess “stable characters, who don’t
change easily, who aren’t easily frightened in battie, and whom one would employ
because of their greater reliability”(503c-d) do flot display the willingness and aptitude
for learning necessary for rigorous philosophic instruction.
Moreover, in the analogy of the line (509d-51 lU), a sequel to the sun simile, where
Plato elaborates upon the relation ship between the two orders of reality introduced in the
simile, this exclusivity is reaffirmed. Briefty, the analogy serves both to outiine the
differing degrees of tmth inherent in the varying reaims of reality and, more
fundamentally, to indicate the varying states of mmd (pathérnata) at work in the
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apprehension of the different reaims. Plato identifies two realms, the intelligible (to
noéton) and the visible (10 horâton) each ofwhich is further divided. The latter entails an
inferior echelon of images, such as shadows and reflections in water etc., and a superior
reaim consisting of the objects they imitate, namely, the tangible elements of which our
physical world consists. The former contains a reaim considered inferior because of its
dependence on assumptions and images as well as an echelon described as superior due
to its fteedom from the constraints of hypothesis and imagery. The four corresponding
states of mmd are, in descending order of reality, noêsis, dianoia, pislis and eikasia.
Noêsis is the purely intellectual diaÏectic’8 mode of apprehension that ascends from the
knowledge of one form to the other culminating with theflrst principÏe, or thefonn ofthe
good. Dianola, or discursive reasoning, is associated with mathematical understanding in
that apprehension is dependent upon the postulation of assumptions. Fislis is the state of
mmd by which the minimal degree oftruth inherent to the physical world is apprehended.
It is the vehicle by which we apprehend as of yet unverifiable contentions. finally, the
state of mmd of eikasia, or illusion, corresponds to the apprehension of images cast by
the objects of the physical realm that are the antipathy of truth and clarity and include
“secondhand impressions and opinions”9 maintained by the majority ofpeople.
The analogy of the line reveals several important elements for the purpose of this
discussion. To begin, it provides the first view as to how the mental state to be attained
by the philosopher ruler differentiates itself from the others. Prior to this point Plato had
18 At die end of tius section there vill be a bnef discussion addressmg the tmnsfonnation of die concept of
die diatectic from that espoused in Plato’s earlier dialogues as tvell as die beginrnng of The Republic to its
present representation in association with die dieory of fonus.
19J.E. Raven, Classical Quarterlv (Jan.-april. 1953). p. 1$.
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spoken of the plight of the philosopher in his pursuit of true knowledge without mention
ofthe complex hierarchy that distinguishes the philosophos from the vast majority of the
population as regards the subject (intellectual operation) and the object (degree ofreality)
of apprehension. Moreover, accompanying this elaboration is the realization that Plato,
by limiting the capacity for noêsis and dianola to the philosopher, must situate the vast
majority of people as trapped within the reaims of images or shadows and, at best,
superficial appearances. The classification provided in the analogy ofthe line, appearing
to render the common man incapable of transcending his illusory existence, has serious
consequence as it applies to the question ofwhether or not true virtue is possible. If Plato
had concluded his characterization of the two orders of reality with the simile of the sun
and the analogy ofthe une the predominant prognosis would be that the acquisition ofthe
knowledge required for virtuous character is limited to a very small, practically
insignificant, minority. As a resuk, the situationist daim that virtue is inaccessible gains
plausibility or at best the argument that stable and reliable ethical traits are generally
attainable and sustainable becomes difficuit to support from a Platonic perspective.
Fortunately, Plato’s cave simile demands a wider interpretation of the classification
set out in the analogy of the line rendering its hopeful message of the potential for ethical
emancipation more generally applicable. Plato employs this final simile so as to reiterate
the essential qualifies of the forms and, at their heim, the form of the good as well as the
relationship between the tangible and intangible realms. In addition the cave simile
serves to improve upon the sun simile and the line analogy on two important levels. First
by enhancing the depiction of the modes of understanding termed pistis and eikasia.
Second by ffirther illustrating the complex nature of the ascending and descending
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movement between the varying layers of reality within the domains of illusion and
intelligence. Briefly, as the content of the simile is well known, Plato relates a tale of
prisoners whose entire existence takes place within the confines of a cave restrained in
such a way so as to render visible only that which is directly in front of them. The cave
itself consists of a long entrance revealing daylight, behind and above the prisoners burns
a fire and between the fire and the prisoners is a road, covered by a curtain, to which the
prisoners have their back. Behind this curtain there are men carrying many items, which
protrude above the curtain, and include articles such as human and animal replicas in a
variety of materials. The fire burning behind the spectacle of men and paraphernalia on
the road works to cast a bizarre shadow on the wall in front of the prisoners which, given
their restrained state, serves as their sole, albeit distorted, view of the world. According
to Plato “in every way they would believe that the shadows ofthe objects we mentïoned
were the whole tnith (aÏéthés).”(5 15e) Plato goes on to explain that if any one of these
prisoners were to be released from their imprisoned state their transition from illusion to
increasing states of reality would undoubtedly be painstaking in that it would entail the
readjustment of their entire conception of reality. Socrates explains that the emancipated
prisoner, whose sight has adjusted to the reality outside of the cave, would be blinded
anew were he to retum to the darkness of the cave. His ability to discern between the
shadows cherished below impeded, lie would be mocked and ridiculed by the cave
dwellers who would consider his vision impaired by the voyage to the outside world. As
a result, any anempt by the ftee man to impart truth and Iiberty to those below would
meet with fierce and violent resistance.
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The key to deciphering this curious tale can be found in the words premising its
account, which exait its role in facilitating the listener’s ability ‘to picture the
enlightenment or ignorance of our human condition.”(5 14a) To begin, this sentence
encapsulates the grandeur of the simile’s task in that it daims to reflect the human
potential for both enÏightenrnent and ignorance. According to Socrates the prisoners in
the cave are “drawn from life”, in the sense that they do flot depict individuals in an
aberrant state of mmd but are representative of the level of awareness proper to the
common nian, or as will be shown, the unreflective mini(515a) The prisoners
constrained within the cave represent, for Plato, the average individual’s failure to
distinguish between illusion and reality when they unquestionably accept appearances.
This, of course, refers to the states of mmd of ilh,sion and belief whose objects are
opinions possessing the appearance of reality but whose tmth has neyer been
substantiated. The ascent from the darkness ofthe cave to the progressively brighter light
of the fire, the light of the outside world and finally the sun itself is a metaphor for the
evolution of the mmd. It depicts the movement from the intellectual darkness of belief
and opinion to the intellectual clarity of intelligence culminating with the apprehension of
the idea ofthe good seen in both the une analogy and the sun simile. Socrates confirms
this interpretation where he says,
“this simile must be connected throughout with what preceded it. The
reaim revealed by sight corresponds to the prison, and the light of the fire
in the prison to the power of the sun. And you won’t go wrong if you
comect the ascent into the upper world and the sight of the objects there
with the upward progress ofthe mmd into the intelligible region. . the final
thing to be perceived only with difficulty, is the form of the good.”(5 I 7a-
b)
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The simile ofthe cave distinguishes itself from the sun simile and the une analogy in
its capacity to illustrate flot only how the upper and lower echelons of knowledge and
truth relate to one another in terms of their relative reality and clarity but why and how
this relationship manifests itself. It graphically portrays the virility of familiar opinions
entrenched in the mmd of the average man and the tenacity with which most individuals
ding to commonly accepted notions resisting their subjection to rigorous questioning and
the dire consequences that ensue. This stubbornness of spirit, for Plato, resuits from
ignorance and serves to maintain human beings in the depths of intellectual darkness.
Clearly it is as a resuit of ignorance that the prisoners resent the emancipated man’s
attempt to liberate them. It is equally ignorance that causes them to revere shadows as
tmth. Plato’s message is transparent; if the prisoners knew the truth about their condition
they would immediately and automatically choose fteedom in the reaÏ world over lïfe in a
prison falsely believed to be that which constitutes living in the world. for Plato, the
misguided prisoners living their lives in ignorance represent the lost souls on earth living
lives devoid of reflection. As has been discussed, Plato equates truth with knowledge of
the forms the acquisition of which necessitates éÏegkhos, or the refiitation of false beliefs,
progressively guiding the mmd towards intelligence.20 The principle impediment to this
intellectual ascent is ignorance of the human condition in the temporal reaim. This
ignorance consists of mistakenly embracing ephemeral preoccupations, such as physical
desires, acquisition ofwealth and titie, as conducive to mie happiness. So strong is the
20Whfle tbis understanding of éïegkhos seems to be put ùito question in the Meno, as will be discussed ai
the end ofthe section on the theory offorms (p. 70-74), there is no doubt that in the Symposium Diotirna’s
description of the dialectic of love supports the contention that knowledge of the forms consists of the
progressive ascension, motivated by love for the beautilifi, of the mmd from the tangible 10 the intangible
reaim through the acquisition of increasingly true ideas and the evacuation offalse beliefs.(2 lOa-2 12b)
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human attachment to such perceived goods that any attempt by the enlightened amongst
men at illuminating an ahernate, tme, path to happiness, requiring the relinquishing of
superficial pursuits, is viciously rejected. It cannot go unmentioned that Plato has
Socrates, his accusers and his trial in view in his portrayal of the free man amongst
prisoners whose attempt at saving them is ignorantly met with violent retribution. Yet,
those who succeed in catching a glimpse of the truth embrace it even more fiercely than
do the ignorant illusions. Once a human being understands the truth of his condition, as
was the case with the liberated prisoner, it is impossible that he will choose to remain in
the shadows. The profound conviction that Plato seeks to impart through the simile of the
cave is that no man of sound mmd chooses the illusion ofbeing over being itself.
This concept brings ffill circle the principle themes, discussed earlier in the essay, of
justice and virtue science whereby Plato rejects the possibility that one can know the truth
or the good and flot embrace it. Justice, or a well ordered soul, results solely when reason
takes its rightffil place at the heim of the soul representing the soul’s emancipation from
the lures of the flesh and the ambitions of Thurnos. For Plato, the absence of internal
harmony whereby the soul is overpowered by Thurnos or appetite does flot result from
weakness but from the absence ofreason; the ignorance as to the good that is the cause of
weakness. The cave simile supports this interpretation; had Plato esteemed enkrateia, or
the seif-mastering over passions, desires and ambitions, as more fundamental to
happiness than reason he would have portrayed the prisoners as rebels who had
succumbed to akrasia, or the act of knowing the good yet choosing the bad. Had this
been Plato’s intent the appropriate treatment for such individuals would have been
rehabilitation not enlightenment, as this would have already proven to be insufficient.
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Instead lie paints the portrait of men whose lot resuits fully from their ignorance of the
good. When seen in this light seif-mastering, or enkrateia, can be understood as inherent
to reason in so far as reason is the principle cause of internai harmony and similarly, the
presence ofselfcontroi is not possible where reason is absent.(430d-432b)2’
Plato’s message, in the cave simile, is an optimistic one in that freedom from our state
of ignorance, identified as the plight of the human condition, is depicted as attainable if
we are to trust the symbolic relevance of the pilgrim who succeeds in elevating his
condition by accessing the outside world. While Plato speaks specifically of the
inteliectual ascent of the philosopher ruler, in the cave simile, lie nonetheless seems to
paint the more general portrait of a remediable human condition whereby the transition
from ignorance to enlightenment lies within our control. A transition that represents the
most important of human pursuits meriting the title of “true phulosophy” and
corresponding to the acquisition of excellence. As Plato so elegantly confirms, “what is
This is an important passage as regards the position espoused throughout the essay concerning Plato’s
view on the possibihly of akrasia and the corresponding role of enkrateia. Here seljdisciptine is ilot
described as a vfrtue reqmred in order to control the weaker elements of Ihe soul (spirit and appetite) but as
a virtue that coincides with the harmony ofthe soul as well as the polis. In fact the terrn that Plato speaks
of in Ibis passage is sophrosuné, translated by G.M.A. Gmbe, rev. and C.D.C. Reeve as moderation, which
Socrates contends is “ridiculously” referred to as “self-control”.(430e) Socrates condemns the latter term
for suggesting that die same person is at once master and siave “The stronger self that does the controiling
is the same as the weaker self that gets controlled, so that only one person is referred to in ail such
expressions.”(430e-43 la) AccordingLy. Socrates goes on to explain, what wili resemble lis description of
justice which foilows, that moderation occurs naturaily within a harmonfous soul where lie says that
“moderation resembles a kind of harmonv”. (43 le) Contraiy to the standard opinion that the division ofthe
sou! in the Platonic corpus must necessarily coincide with the existence of akrasia and enkrateia Plato
writes “unlike courage and wisdom, each ofwhich resides in one part. malting the city brave and wise
respectively, moderation spreads throughout the whoie. It makes the weakest, the strongest. and those in
between — whether in regard to reason. physical strength, numbers, wealth, or anything eise — ai! sing the
same song together. And this unanirnity, this agreement between the natural!y worse and the naturally
beiler as to which of the two ïs to mie both in the city and in each one. is nghtly caiied modemtion.”(43 le
432a) In ‘4krasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mmd?” Gabnela Carone supports this reading of
The Republic ‘s depiction of akrasia where she writes, “Plato chamcterizes virtue flot as reason exerting
controi on desires which may none the less oppose it in strength. but as harmony and friendship between ail
parts ofthe sou!, which have corne to share the same beliefs (4, 444D 13-E I, 443 D 3-E2. 442 C l0-D3).
How can such a friendship and harmony exist at ail, uniess one supposes that the lower desfres in that case
have a strength which is proportional!y subservient to (mther than antagonistic to or independent o!) the
degree ofgood that the virtuous and knowledgeable person expects to obtain ftom realising them?”(p. 127)
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at issue is the conversion ofthe mmd from a kind oftwilight to the true day, that climb up
into reaiity which we shah say is tme phiiosophy.”(521c) It is clearly this wider
interpretation ofPlato’s message that is retained and propagated throughout the essay as a
response to the lack of vii-tue to which the experiments and historical experiences
discussed previously attest. furthermore, as will be seen, it is this reading ofPlato that is
supported and elaborated upon later in The Republic. In book ten, Piato overtiy and
conclusiveiy proclaims the necessity of phiiosophy, in direct opposition to habit and
custom, as the sole means to happiness in this life and the next as regards ail persons and
flot soleiy the philosopher ruler.
finaliy, even if knowiedge ofthe forms, which Plato depicts as the source of vii-tue, is
potentiaily universally attainable their abstract nature brings into question the very
existence, or at best the attainability of, the forms themselves. If one is to adopt a
Platonic point ofview in response to the situationists’ daims and, more importantly, as a
path to vii-tue, as is the case here, then does the failure to pi-ove the existence ofthe forms
undermine the validity of the theory that stems from them or the possibility of vii-tue ail
together? Firstly, the validity of the principles that result from the theory of forms is
sustainable independentiy of their source. The necessity to look beyond the mere
acceptance of the opinions of the many in the hope of identifying intellectually veriflable
principies so as to guide our moral conduct has tremendous ment in and of itself The
value of phiiosophical reflection as to right conduct and the ordering of oui- soul
according to an elevated psychologicai state that reigns over our desires and ambitions is
profoundly valid regardless of the existence of Plato’s theoiy of forms. Nonetheless, the
fundamentai principle of the forms, if given a contemporary interpretation, do have an
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indisputable pertinence on at Ieast one very important level, relative to the discussion at
hand, whïch stems from the very foots of Plato’s inception of the intelligible forms.
Plato’s Cratilian and Heraclitian influences convinced him of the lack of stability of the
tangible reaim. Heraclitus argued that “you could not step into the same river, for other
waters are ever flowing on to you” so as to illustrate his contention that the tangible
world is in a constant state of flux. Cratilus pushed this theory to its extreme conclusion
maintaining that we cannot even step into hie sanie river once suggesting that nothing
remains itself long enough so as to be identified, or known. It bas been argued that Plato
posited the theory of forms in an attempt to save knowÏedge SO to speak. That is to say,
Plato removed the forms from the tangible reaim so as to preserve their existence as
knowable entities. As a resuit, even if Heraclitus and Cratilus are right and knowledge
within the tangible realm is impossible all is flot lost if that which gives the physical
domain its presence is safely preserved in the intelligible realm separate from the
incessant change of the visible reaim. A similar concern continues to preoccupy ethical
philosophy in general and the present inquiry in particular. Underlying the conclusion
adopted here that correct ethical choices are consistently possible is the principle that
there exists a code of correct conduct by which the ethical person will abide. Identifiable
ethical principles are a necessary condition for correct choice. As a result, if there is to
be a standard of acceptable behavior the ethical principles guiding this behavior must flot
be susceptible to fluctuation. Instead they must be constant, reliable and unchanging.
This of course recalls and preserves the characteristics of the fonns on a practical level.
In sum, even if the forms can not be known or if they do not exist the acceptance of the
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less abstract concept of inalienable principles in ethics may be said to shield against the
relativism that so preoccupied Plato.
The following conclusion of the present section on the theory of forms represents a
brief digression seeking to shed light on the transition of Plato’s portrayal of diaÏectic
from its refutative and interactive nature discussed earlier,22 to its role in the
apprehension of the supreme principle of knowledge, noêsis. Clearly in the analogy of
the line the diatectic to which Socrates refers (51 lb) is disconnected from two of its
previously determining characteristics namely that of interactive discourse between
interlocutors and the refittative nature typically associated with Socratic argumentation
discussed earlier. This shifi in the nature of the dialectic found within the analogy of the
une is echoed throughout the latter part of The Republic wherein the refittative element of
the discussion, stili quite evident early on, dissipates as the dialogue progresses. In
Socrates, Ironist and moral philosopher (1991) Gregoiy Viastos explains this
methodological deviation as resulting from a profound personal intellectual
transformation in the life of Plato.(p. 165) The cmx of Viastos’ argument is that what
amounts to the “throwing overboard”(p. 165) of éiegkhos coincides with the advanced
state of Plato’s immersion into the study of mathematics. Viastos contends that this
aheration of intellectual focus Ïed to Plato’s losing faith in his traditional rçfiitative
method of edification and, more generally, education. He suggests that important
instances where the i’efittative diaiectic is shunned occur as a resuit of their inadequate fit
with the mathematical model which, according to Viasitos, Plato was in the process of
constmcting. In Meno Vlastos points to “a reduced version of éiegkhos” whereby
22 The refittative dialectic typical ofthe dialogues ofPlato’s youth is discussed on pages 42-44.
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Socrates seeks to “demonstrate” that learning resuits from reminiscence by allowing a
young slave to “discover” the solution to a geometrical problem.23(p. 166) Here Socrates
departs from his traditional adversarial role, which according to Viastos, proves
inadequate, by providing the young slave with a necessary hint which serves to trigger his
reminiscence of the solution to the geometrical problem in question. for Viastos these
exchanges depict two pivotai departures from the earlier refittative dialogues; first, the
recourse to geometry and second the theory of reminiscence. Viastos considers the
presence of these two themes as highly significant, the first in so far as it reveals the
advanced state of Plato’s knowledge and interest in geometry and the latter in so far as it
clearly departs from the aporetic nature of the refiitative dialogues. As discussed earlier,
PÏato’s refittative dialogues were flot intended to arrive directly at knowledge but to
dispel false beliefs serving to impede the apprehension of truth. Viastos interprets this
shifi as Plato’s renunciation ofthe elenctic method due to its inadequacy when compared
to its mathematically inspired rival in bringing about conclusive verifiable
knowledge.(p16$) finally, Viastos finds further support for his theory in Plato’s use of
hypothesis in Meno as a starting point for discussion as to whether or flot virtue can be
taught.(86e-87b) Viastos argues that study by hypothesis undermines the Socratic
insistence seen in previous dialogues, and central to éÏegkhos, that the premise of
philosophical discussion aiways consist of only that in which the interlocutors truly
believe.(p. 173-174)
As concerns the scope of the present inquiry, while Viastos’ arguments are
indisputable on certain levels their applicabilïty to The Reptiblic solicits reserve. First,
$2a-85c.
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that there is an obvious movement away from the traditional refrtative diatectic of the
earlier dialogues in the transitional dialogues as well as the dialogues of maturity and
advanced age24 is clear. Mso Viastos’ contention that this shifi reflects an underlying
doctrinal metamorphosis seems inevitable. The nature of the mathematical influence to
which he points, particularly in Meno, also seems well founded. Nonetheless, as regards
The RepiibÏic Plato’s blind faith in the mathematical model seems to have, once again,
metamorphosed. While a detailed account of the influence of Plato’s mathematical
preoccupations on The Repubiic is clearly out of place at this junction, a few salient
points ment mention. To begin, the early portion of The Republic is unquestionably
refutative reminiscent of the early Platonic dialogues.25 Also, it is quite significant that
while Plato clearly recognizes the elevated stature of the study of mathematics on ah
levels, the education ofthe philosopher rulers and its importance in the ascension towards
the supreme knowledge of the good, its status remains inferior to the purely intellectual
realm of noêsis. As a resuit, knowledge dependent on hypothetical postulations is
subjugated by the intellectual apprehension of anhypothetical truths associated with the
form ofthe good. Mso, unlike what we see in Meno, in The RepubÏic, Plato reverts to the
wholly aporetic model of the earlier dialogues. The dialogue concludes with a myth
attesting to the irresolute nature of the questions under discussion. More importantly
stili, the thematic content of the dialogue mimics its aporetic structure. The question of
24 I am referring to Vlastos’ chronological classification as put forth in Ironist and moral philosopher.
25 In Book I of The Repubtic there are several mentions ofthe tenn refutation spoken by Socrates’
emphatically confrontational interlocutor, Thrasymachus.( 336c, 337e,) Moreover, at the close of his
exchange with Thrasymachus Socrates describes hun as “blushing” wluch coincides with the shamed
persona ofa refuted interlocutor.(350d) Furthermore. Socrates implores Thrasyrnachus to say only what he
tnily believes. again a typcal component ofthe elenctic dialogue.(350e) Thrasymachus admits to having
been reduced to knowing nothing(354b-c) in keeping with the traditional goal of élegkhos. finally. in Book
Il Glaucon argues that the goal of the discussion is flot to “seem to have persuaded” his interlocutors
but... [to] truly convince” them as to the truth of his message.(3 57a-b).
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justice can flot be concretely dernonstrated it can only be accomplished in the soul of the
indïvidual who has the courage to rid himself of the mistaken opinions wïth which the
impure polis is imbued. If Plato does experience the euphoria of mathematically inspired
knowledge perhaps this phenomenon is best understood as yet another stage in the
evolution of his thought. As this brief digression has attempted to outiine, it would
appear that, in ffindamental ways, in The RepubÏic Plato retums to his elenctic foots in
spite ofthe absence ofthe technical characteristics typically associated with éÏegkhos.
As a resuit, an attempt to identify the evolution of Platonic thought by focusing on the
continuity, as opposed to the apparent dichotomy, in the concept of diaiectic may prove
insightful. The virtual evacuation of the other that occurs on both levels, content and
form, in The Republic is not gratuitous and can be interpreted as indicative ofthe fact that
Plato’s abandonment of the etenctic method represents a thematic evolution, only not the
evolution ofPlato’s mathematical development as suggested by Viastos but, the evolution
of lis theory of forms. In this sense, and in keeping with an extraordinary thematic
consistency, Plato’s concept of diaiectic can be said to follow the lead of knowledge and
reaÏity in that it varies with respect to the subject matter it addresses. That is to say, when
truth is sought regarding questions appropriate to the visible reaim then discussion
respects its tangible form and interlocutors move towards increasing clarity in so far as
this is attainable while understanding continues to be dependant upon images. Yet once
the dialogue broaches subjects of an increasingly metaphysical nature the diatectic
arguably is emancipated accordingly from the tangible reaim and consequently from the
necessity of the interlocutors who represents it. When understood in this light the
diaiectic persists intact throughout in its essential capacity as a dynamic tool conducting
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the mmd progressively higher and ultimately towards the supreme principle of
knowledge. Consequently, as opposed to identifying a tension between the two versions,
the interactive and solitary diatectic may be seen as a natural extension of one another,
whereby each is appropriate to the echelon it serves, as they move from the tangible
domain of opinion to the intelligible reaim of science. A continuity that maintains the
integrity of Socrates’ avowal to the men of Athens to,
“obey the god rather than [them], and as long as I draw breath and am
able, I shah not cease to practice philo sophy. . .1 shall question him, [who
does not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible
state of his soulJ examine him and test him. . . even if I am to face death
many times.”(Ap. 29c3Oc)
TheMyth ofEr
The theories of justice and forms that Plato develops throughout The Reputbile
synthesize in the myth of Er(614b-621b), concluding the dialogue, so as to provide an
enlightened formula serving to guide the process by which individuals make hife-altering
choices. A formula that is considered here to be a preferred alternative to the situationist
account of the human capacity for virtue providing profound insight into the factors
contributing to ethical behavior or the lack thereof To begin, the myth represents Plato’s
deviation from the use of prose in preference of more illustrative explanatory tools. This
may be seen as the first hint as to the content of the myth. In The RepubÏlc Plato has
turned to the use of pictorial and poetic hiterary styles under specific circumstances,
namely, in order to relate that which transcends the reacli of traditional prose. Contraiy
to the contention that such literary tools represent a doctrinal luli it would appear that in
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The RepubÏic Plato cails upon them when revealing his most sublime theories; previously
the forms with the similes of the sun and the cave as well as the analogy of the une and
now, as will be shown, the fate ofthe soul.
In the myth Plato recounts the stoly of Er, a soldier, who was killed in battle only to
retum from the other world as a messenger bearing invaluable information about choice
and responsibility. Er recounts how the souls, referred to as the “souls of a day”(617d)
and arriving both from heaven and earth, are informed by Lachesis, one ofthe three fates
and daughter of Necessity who sings to the sirens’ music of things past, that “here (they)
must begin another round of mortal life whose end is death.”(617d) An interpreter
proceeds to explain that, by “the word of Lachesis”(617d), each sou!, respecting the
numerical order of the lot which they are attributed, is directÏy responsible, without the
assistance of a Guardian Spirit, for choosing their future life on earth from amongst a
series of potential life choices. Naturally the array of options will decrease as the
numerical value of the lot increases leaving fewer potential life options. The interpreter
then sets before them a number of life pattems, exceeding the quantity of souls, and
consisting of “every conceivable kind”(617e-61$a) the character of which it was lefi up
to the souls ofa day to decipher. The interesting outcome is that the first sou! to choose
acted hastily without tmly reflecting upon his selection and elected the life of a tyrant. As
his choice was irrevocable he was devastated when granted a preview of the future
depicting a life consumed by unimaginable evil.(619b-c) Er goes on to describe how “for
the most part (the remaining souls) followed the habits of their former life”(620a) when
effecting their choice. for example, the sou! of Orpheus chose the life of a swan since,
having died at female hands, he refused to be born to a woman and the “baffoon”,
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Thersites, chose the life of an ape in keeping with lis former life, to name a couple. Only
Odysseus, the last soul in the selection process, deviates from this pattem by seeking out
a future life that differs greatly from his previous one when he embraces the life,
neglected by the others, of an ordinary man who minds his own business.(620c)
An attentive analysis ofPlato’s myth ofEr reveals a synopsis of Socrates’ response to
the central question of The Repubtic as well as to this essay, namely, why morality is
desirable as an end in itself and how this revelation serves to assure its actualization. b
begin, the myth is wrought with intricate symbolism throughout that contributes to the
depth and clarity with which Plato’s message is advanced. In keeping with the
importance of Plato’s use of myth, the subject matter further exposes the appropriateness
ofthis vehicle. A discussion revealing the structure ofthe universe and judgement in the
other world does flot constitute verifiable knowledge as it is beyond the capacity of any
man’s experience and, as a resuit, it cannot form the object of rigorous discussion.
Further motivation underlying Plato’s use of myth may stem from the fact that Socrates’
avowal of ignorance impedes him from imparting such knowledge directly necessitating
the introduction of a third party as source of knowledge, in this case, ihe rnyth. Another
interesting symbolic nuance is Plato’s choice of Lachesis as presiding over the ceremony
commencing the selection process for the next “round of mortal life”.(617d) Lachesis is
one of the daughters of lzecessity which may readily be understood as representing the
inevitability of the process that Er describes. Moreover she is said to be one of the three
fates allowing for the interpretation that what follows contains an element of fate yet
Socrates explicitly negates the role of fate, or divine providence, where he says that “The
fault lies flot with God, but with the soul that makes the choice.”(617e) One way of
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reconciling this apparent inconsistency may lie in Plato’s characterization of Lachesis as
singing “of things past”.(617c) When considered within the context of the myth in its
entirety it becomes clear that while the choice of a future life rests completely within the
hands ofthe soul choosing it nonetheless depends upon, and is in this respect determined
by, the nature of his previous life. As will become increasingly clear as the analysis
progresses, the soul’s future is fated by its past life. The subtlety of this message is
encapsulated within the following insightful words imparted by Lachesis to the souls
prior to effecting their future life choices “excellence knows no master; a man shah have
more or less of her according to the value he sets on her.”(617e) The underlying
question, if excellence is to be achieved, becomes; how is the value one places on
excellence estabhished? And the answer can be summed up in one word phiÏosophy. In
the myth of Er, contrary to the sun simile and the analogy of the hine, Plato speaks of
human excellence in general and flot specifically as it pertains to the philosopher mier.
He argues that the degree to which it is achieved depends on the extent to which each and
every one of us has valued, and consequently, pursued the love of wisdom. As we have
seen it is this premise that forms the foundation of Plato’s theories of justice and the
forms. In the pivotal passage reproduced below, where Socrates reiterates the imperative
of the acquisition of knowledge as a necessary condition for the reahization of human
excellence, he expressly addresses a fundamental aspect of this required knowledge to
which he has only previously alluded. The understanding in question consists of the
clarity of mmd required so as to identify the spiritual guide who may then lead us to
embracing the life saving philosophy permitting us to make “supreme choices”. Plato
describes this process as,
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“the moment. . . when everything is at stake”. “And that is why (he goes on
to say) it should be our first care to abandon ail other forms of knowledge,
and seek and study that whïch wili show us how to pefceive and find the
man who will give us the knowledge and abiÏity to teil a good life from a
bad one and aiways choose the better course so far as we can; we must
reckon up ail that we have said in this discussion of ours, weighing the
arguments together and apart to find out how they affect the good life, and
see what effects, good or iii, good looks have when accompanied by
poverty or wealth or by different dispositions of character, and what again
are the effects of the various bÏends of birth and rank, strength and
weakness, cleverness and stupidity, and ail other qualities inborn or
acquired. If we take ail this into account and remember how the soul is
constituted, we can choose between the worse life and the better, callïng
the one that leads us to become more unjust the worse, and the one that
leads us to become more just the better. Everything else we can let go, for
we have seen that this is the best choice both for living and dead.”(6 1 8c-e)
In his article, “The Myth of Er”, H.S. Thayer (1988) reads this passage as a clear
affirmation that “there is a science and knowledge (epistémé) for discerning the good life
and enabling us to choose the best”. Thïs interpretation clearly supports the analysis of
The Republic put forth throughout the essay. Thayer, who shares the non-exclusive
readïng of The Repubtic adopted throughout the essay, proceeds to ask the following
question “how are we to acquire this knowledge; where are we, in Socrates’ words, to
“learn and discover who can give” us this power?”(p.371) The conclusion to which
Thayer arrives is that it is in Socrates that the enlightened interlocutors recognize their
spiritual guide and in The Repubhc, as a whole, that the attentive reader is directed
towards the path of philosophy, the sole key to correct moral choice and ultimately
happiness. In the myth, serving as moral guide, it is the excellence of one’s future life
that is at stake and it is dependent upon the pursuit of philosophy, consisting, as we have
seen, of knowledge of the forms and the resulting equilibrium of the soul, accomplished
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prior to one’s death. In sum, Plato conflrms eveiy nîai ‘s potential for virtue where he
writes the following;
“anyone who, during his earthly life, faithfully seeks wisdom and whose
lot does flot fali among the last may hope, if we may believe Er’s tale, flot
only for happiness in this life but for a journey from thïs world to the next
and back again that will flot lie over the stony ground of the underworld
but along the smooth road ofheaven.”(619d-e)
Plato illustrates the consequences of having lived either an ignorant or enlightened
existence on just or unjust future life choïces by painting the portraits of two souls, one
who chooses a good flfe as well as of his unfortunate counterpart who chooses the worse
hfe. Plato’s ingenuity, and the crucial knowledge that he imparts regardïng the central
question of this essay, lies in the atypical form that he attributes to the unjust soul.
Curiously, the sou! that chose the life of a tyrant was a soul that had descended from
heaven. Plato employs this juxtaposition of good, symbolized by heaven, and evil, the
future !ife choice of a despicable tyrant, so as to boldly i!lustrate the be!ief developed
throughout The Repitbhc, that evil stems flot from the conscious rejection of the good,
akrasia, but from the misguided acceptance of apparent good as good itself26 Plato
26jce again, Gabriela Carone in “Àkra.sia in the Republic: Does Piato Change bis Mmd?” interprets the
story ofLeontius (439e-440a) in a manner that demonstrates the same point that I am arguing in this
passage relative to the unenviable soul who chooses the future life of a tyrant. As mentioned, in endnote
number fourteen (p. 47) above, Leontius’ internai struggie is sited by the proponents ofthe prevalent view
of akrasia in The Republic as proof of Piato’ s acknowledgement of desire’s potential to overcome reason.
b begin, Carone correctly identifies that nowhere in this passage is reason mentioned, the struggie that
takes place occurs between Ovpôuand the Ovpqrzii5v and may serve to show that the former part ofthe
soin is not aiways necessarily victorious over 117e latter. Yet. she goes 017 to say that. even if we admit that
Ovpôo- is fighting against appetite for something that reason wouid “normally believe to be good” and that
desire is triumphant “the agent does flot need to be acting against what lie at that tue believes to be best.”
Her point, similar to mine, is that, if Leontius’ reason is overcome it is a weak form of reason that falis
more appropriately under the heading of Socrates’ understanding of niistaken belief She writes, “Reason is
‘overpowered’ not in the sense that the agent perforuls the action wlffle at the sanie lime strongly believing
that 17e should not, but in the sense that. at that moment, bis reason lias been weakened and corne to adopt
the beliefs ofthe prevailing part... Coifflict ui the Republic may thus be seen as synchronic mIlle sense that
there are sllnukaneous conflicting things that are believed to be good, and tue conflict is regrettable because
it may result 117 a belief prevailing wluch is not gromlded in the reai good.”(p. 138-139) In lier conclusion
she writes, “even though 117e RepubÏic may present a picture of reason being opposed and overturned by
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clearly conveys this message where he writes that the soul was unequipped to make this
pivotal decision because,
was one of the souls who had come from heaven, having lived his
previous life in a well governed state, but having owed his goodness to
habit and custom and flot to phulosophy; and indeed, broadly speaking, the
majority ofthose who were caught in this way corne from heaven without
the discipline of suifering, while those who came from earth had suffered
themselves and seen others suifer and were flot so hasty in their
choice.”(6 1 9c-d)
Here, for the first time in the dialogue, Plato speaks specifically of the potentially
deceptive nature of the supposedly well-governed life. Plato vividly warns against the
destructive illusion of security masking the apparently well-governed life that has
consisted principally of abiding by conventional dictums, habits and customs, under
familiar and unchallenging circumstances. These habits and customs result from the
mistaken beliefs, pistis, and illusions, eikasia, discussed earlier in the line analogy and
the sïmile of the cave, associated with the physical world in which we live, to horcton.
On a more practical level, they take the form of socially accepted tmths held by the
majority that solidify themselves into habituated behavior and customary practices as
regards ail areas of life, including morality. These so-caÏled truths are based on
unenlightened beliefs resultïng, not from philosophicai reflection but, simply from the
acceptance of the visible reaim, accessible flot by the mmd but by appetite and spirit or
ambition, as the ultimate reality. Moreover, these faise opinions, valuing pleasure and
lower desfres, Plato ïs there maldng it clear that those would be cases where reason lias been ieft
underdeveloped, in such a way that the individual’s incomplete share in reason is far from being equated to
the possession ofknowledge. Rather, it is when reason bas been made weak’ in ignorant souls devoid of
voûs that it cannot mie and is easily draggcd about (cf. 9, 586 B-D, 58$ F-589 A. 590 C); by contrast, in
the real lover of truth and knowiedge ail other desfres have become weaker (cf. 6. 485 A-E).”(p. 144)
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ambition above ail else, are transmitted from generation to generation without question or
reflection as to their validity resuhing in a generalized ethical malaise. These habits and
customs are conducive to, at best, a life resembiing that of “a blind man on the right
path”, as described by Plato earlier in The Repiibiic, in that conventional opinions create
the illusion of a good 1fe within the safe boundaries of situations that do flot challenge
one’s ethical foundation. The danger being that the empty values underÏying this
semblance of morality will crumble when challenged rendering the soul defenseless in
the face ofthe greatest human baffle, the authentic edification ofthe sou!. The misguided
soul in the myth of Er was handicapped precisely because his life in heaven had flot
presented him with the ethical challenges, or siffl’ring as Plato suggests, that would have
obliged him to reflect upon the conventional beliefs which governed his life and
progressively elevate his ethical knowledge to the status of infallible truth. “For this
reason”, writes Plato, “and because of the luck of the draw there was a general change of
good for evil and evil for good.”(619d) Lacking the wisdom to recognize and
subsequently pursue a good life consisting of justice at ail costs, the soul from heaven
mistook the life of a tyrant and the wealth and power it represents as the good. Had this
sou! passionately pursued philosophy it would have understood that the life of a tyrant
runs contrary to true human happiness as it fails to maintain the delicate balance between
reason, Thumos and appetite necessary for the harmony of the soul that is dikalosuné.
The tyrant’s incommensurate desire for wealth and power resuits in the inappropriate
reign of Thurnos and appetite over reason. Plato brilliantly expresses this contention
where he writes that the principle human preoccupation must consist of the relentless
pursuit ofthe wisdom that leads to the good life,
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“so that we may be unmoved. . .by the temptation ofwealth or other evils,
and avoid falling into the life of a tyrant or other evil-doer and
perpetrating unbearable evil and suffering worse, but may rather know
how to choose the middie course, and avoid so far as we can, in this life
and the next, the extremes on either hand. for this is the surest way to the
highest human happiness.”(6 1 9a-b)
Odysseus, in spite of being the iast soul to enact his future life selection and
consequently having a greatly limited array of choices before him, typifies the
enlightened choice of a just soul. As it turns out Lachesis was tme to her word when she
ciaimed that “even for the last corner, if he chooses wisely and lives strenuously, there is
lefi a life with which he may be weii content.” Odyesseus confirms this where he
rejoices his future life decision claïrning that “had bis lot fallen first he would have made
the same choice.” After looking “round for a long time, Odysseus finaily came upon the
“uneventful life of an ordinary man. . . lying neglected by the others.”(620c-d) Odysseus’
selection was based upon his liberation from ail ambition as a resuit of his previous
sufferings. Piato’s message ïs that phiiosophy, consisting of the profound reflection of
life experiences, wiII lead to a clear vision of the truth towards which one must tend.
Odysseus’ choice of an ordinary man symbolizes his recognition of the beauty of
moderation and his disdain for excesses of any kind. Which, as we have seen, are the
defining principles of justice personified by the choosing soul that was Odysseus. Plato
concludes the myth and with it The Repubhc by stressing the tremendous importance of
Er’s message where he writes the foilowing,
“if we remember it, (it) may well preserve us in tum, and we shah cross
the river of Lethe safely and shah flot defile our souis. This at any rate is
my advice, that we should believe the soul to be immortal, capable of
enduring ail evil and ail good, and aiways keep our feet on the upward
way and pursue justice with wisdom. So we shall be at peace with the
gods and with ourselves, both in our life here and when hike the victors in
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the games coliecting their prizes, we receive our reward; and both in this
life and in the thousand-year journey which I have described, ail will be
well with us.”(62 1 c-d)
Finally, in this passage, Plato faithfully establishes, on yet another level, the intricate link
between true knowledge and virtue as regards ethical choice in that knowing what is right
ïs sufficient 50 as to assure the choice of a just life. In his article Thayer arrives at a
similar conclusion where he writes that “knowing what is right, and choosing
accordingly, cornes close to ffilfihling the very meaning of moral conduct, for Plato,
knowledge and virtue, again, being interrelated.”(p.373)
If we are to adopt an inclusive, wider, reading of The Repubbc as suggested earlier, it
is reasonable to assume that, while the myth is preoccupied with the fate ofthe soul upon
death, this message applies with equal tenacity to our present lives and to the important
ethical choices that we make every day. In the article mentioned above, “The Myth of
E?’, H. S. Thayer arrives at the same conclusion. He speaks of the symbolic importance
of the “timelessness of the scenery and events of the myth” accomplished by Plato’s
portrayal of “tife. . . as an endless series of transitions in which souls pass to and fro ftorn
earthly existence to the journey of 1000 years in the other world.”(p.376) Thayer
interprets Plato’s temporal mise en scene as intended to relay the message that the myth
is playing itself out in a constant state of “now”. He goes on to say that while a sense of
past and future exists within the myth, involving the consideration ofpast life experiences
as well as their counterparts, future life choices, the focal point remains grounded in the
moment; the act of choosing. Thayer writes, “the full moral force of the story is
concentrated in this present moment which will continue to be repeated endlessly in an
etemal series of “nows”. He ffirther points to Plato’s use of the term seuls cf a day,
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describing the choosing souls, as an indication ofPlato’s intention to generalize the act of
choice so as to include the daily moral decisions that amount exponentially into human
excellence. Thayer contends that Er’s message, in spite of its unquestionable
fictitiousness, “contains the most realïstically practical and worldly deliverance one could
hope for and with ail the redeeming utility one could demand.”(p.376) Thayer’s
insistence on the importance of the myth’s message resembles closely that of Socrates
himself in the dialogue. As does Thayer’s contention that the myth be interpreted as
suggesting that ail human beings are inevitably called upon to make choices that will
have serious and long lasting consequences on one’s “character and the direction of the
life we go on to live and which will also qualify other choices we may make in the
future.”(p.377) He goes on to describe the act that accompanies these important
occurrences of choice in our lives as manifestations of taking “our life into our hands”.
He concludes by saying, “hie Republic as a whole is addressed to these perennially
occurring perils and critical crises in human life, whatever particular forms they take and
variety of occasions. for it is just in such cases that the lesson needs most to be learned
concerning the meaning and moral importance ofhow to choose well.”(p. 377)
Joel Kupperman in his article “The Indispensability of Character” also recognizes the
timeless relevance of Plato’s ethical philosophy where lie looks towards a Platonic
response, as we have done, to the situationist’s daims. In the above mentioned essay,
Kupperman addresses his commentary principally to the following arguments articulated
by Gilbert Harman; “it may even be the case that there is no such thing as character, no
ordinary character traits of the sort people think there are” and “we need to convince
people to look at situational factors and to stop trying to explain things in terms of
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character traits.”(p.239) Kupperman’s response to the situationists is that their position is
based upon what he considers to be an overly simplified “view of what character
is.”(p.240) As a resuit, Kupperman looks towards Plato’s The Republic as providing a
more profound conception of character and moral virtue.27 He argues that while Harman
looks to the Miigram experiments as proofthat “virtuous character is an illusion” perhaps
“a Platonic response is that. . .what they show is that it is much rarer than most people
might suppose.”(p.243) Rarer because, as the myth of Er teaches us, virtue must be
profoundly assimilated and does flot result from the mere adhesion to societal norms.
Kupperman describes the morally exemplary individual as differing “from most people
both in (terms of their) goals and in the way she or he interprets morally problematic
situations.”(p. 245) This understanding of the elements determining ethical behavior
seems to provide a contemporary version of the Platonic view once it has been liberated
from the abstract constraints of the theory of forms. As Kupperman suggests, the degree
of “moral reliability” that a person demonstrates when faced with morally problematic
situations will depend a great deal on the nature ofthe values and goals they embrace. As
the myth of Er clearly depicts, the sou! from heaven chose the life of a tyrant precisely
because he lacked the power of his convictions. A more familiar example might be that
the correct moral behavior of a spouse with profoundly religious convictions would
arguab!y be more reliable when faced with the temptation of breaking his or her vows.
Whereas a person who does flot value the sacrament of marnage and the commitment that
it entails but who has nonetheless “habitually” behaved well may be Iess reliable in a
tempting situation without any fear of conventional reprisais. Kupperman argues,
27 A more detailed account of Plato’s conception of character takes place on pages 51-57.
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consistently along Platonic unes, that “the way in which someone takes, or perceives a
situation” contributes with equal force to the reaim of choice wherein what the individual
perceives as salient in the situation will determine the moral value of his choice.
Kupperman’s contention is that judgments associated with genuine virtue would of
course involve a different way of seeing morally problematic situations.”(p.247) This
way of seeing the world in tum manifests itself into, and is influenced by, important life
projects and the attainment of certain moral standards. Kupperman adds that, while there
is inevitably aftuidity and openness to life that resuits in change, and less than absolute
predictability, of character and behavior there nonetheless remain core values and
pursuits that motivate the self-control required for their preservation. Yet, concludes
Kupperman, the consistent adherence to these principles “may be less common than
people think.”(p.250)
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Chapter IV: The Republic Answers the Situationist Claim
Philosophy; Choosing the Kind of Person Ihat We Want to Be
The message that this essay has endeavored to impart is that within each of us resides
the potentially nameless soul of a future tyrant or the just soul and virtuous life choice of
Odysseus. The power as to which course we choose rests in our hands and depends upon
the degree to which we pursue virtue throughout the course of our lives and the impact
that our character has on the daily choices that, ultimately, define us. The lack of
virtuous character that the situationists’ point to, and the examples discussed in this essay
aftest to, is proofthat some, if flot most, individuals do not possess Odysseus’ strength of
character. This, unfortunately, is an empirical fact acknowledged, flot only by
contemporary situationist theorists but, by Plato himself whose Republic was written in
response to the lack of virtue that he witnessed in Greek society. Consequently, it is not
the situationists’ observations offaltering virtue, as such, that is in question here28 but the
erroneous transition from empirical observation to philosophical conclusion in which the
28 The accuracy ofthe statïstics pointing to lack ofcharacter put forth by the situationists are certainly put
mto questions by authors such as Glopal Sreemvasan in his article entitled “Virtue Theory and Trait
Attribution” (2002) and Seymour Epstein in his article “The Stability of Behavior: On Predicting Most of
the People Much ofthe Tirne.” (1979) The former disputes the interpretation ofthe data upon which
Gilbert Harman and John Dons base their conclusions. He discusses three inadequacies in the
expenrnental situations employed by the situationists so as to test die reliabihty of character traits: 1. Their
failure to take into account the subject’s own construal ofthe situation. 2. Their inclusion of behaviour
only marginally relevant to die trait in question. 3. Their disregard for die normative clmracter of die
responses in which virtue theory is interested.(p. 47) The latter, Fpstein. refutes die situationists’ position
on a methodological basis. He is cntical of trait studies that base their conclusions about behaviour on one
situation. He argues that if we observe traits over a longer period of time stabilitv does emerge. According
to Epstein, stable character traits are observed over a wide range of variables provided diat thev are
evaluated over a sufficient number of occurences. (p. 1105)
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situationists engage. That is to say, situationist theorists accept, what they consider to be,
weakness of character as an ïnevitable function of human nature upon which they
develop a theory of virtue wherein ethical choice is exercised only as regards avoidance
of morally problematic, and thus potentially dangerous, situations as discussed earlier.(p.
34-3$). In contrast, the superiority of Platonic and Socratic ethical philosophy in
shedding light on the nature of human virtue stems precisely from its ifindamental belief
that lack of virtue, far from inexorable, is an unfortunate departure from the moral
excellence that is, flot only attainable but, the defining principle ofwhat it is to be human.
In this manner preserving the crucial ethical dimension entailed in the important life
defining choices that amount to choosing the kind ofpe;on that ive want to be.
It is along these determining theoretical unes that the situationists and the ancients
divide as regards their understanding of the unenviable ethical conduct of Eichmann, the
Milgram and Stanford Prison subjects, as well as the Military Police and Intelligence in
Abu Ghraib. The Situationists consider these occurrences as proof of the fact that
ordinarily good peopie will behave immorally in ethically challenging situations.
Unfortunately, as has been shown, the situationists are flot overly concemed with the
unavoidable question as to why virtuous individuals 50 readily succumb to situational
pressures. Situationists argue that their observations dernonstrate the weakness of human
character and the unreliability of virtuous character traits, yet they fail to expiaiii the root
cause of this behavior. Certianly iack ofcharacter cannot be summoned to explain iack
of character; any more than darkness can suffice to explain night. The force of Plato’s
ethical philosophy is that it helps us to tmly understand that which the situationists
simply observe. In The Repubiic, it becomes apparent that seemingly good people, who
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behave badly, such as the subjects of our study, are just that seerningly good but not tndy
good. From this Socratic perspective the lack of virtue to which these cases attest is
thought to result from ignorance as to what the right thing to do consists of As should
be abundantly clear by now, Plato characterizes virtuous action as the fruit ofphitosophy
attainable solely through profound and consistent reflection of ones self and others the
culmination of which is the knowledge that leads to choosing the virtuous life course.
When seen in this light, the deplorable behavior addressed throughout the essay can be
understood as resulting from insufficient training in virtue rendering the individuals
involved iii equipped to face the ethically challenging scenarios with which they met. If
we are to trust Plato, then the apparent goodness attributed to the subjects in question was
the resuit of habit and mere adherence to societal norms and customs that proved void of
substance when put to the test. In fact each and every analysis conducted throughout the
course of this essay can be seen as pointing to the validity of this explanation. To begin,
the examples discussed clearly show that the despicable behavior that occurred did flot
result from profound ideological convictions, psychological deviations or malevolent
motivations, but merely ftom a variety of baiîaÏ factors that succeeded in exercising
tremendous behavioral influence. As regards Adoif Eichmann, discussed earlier in
depth(p. 8-16), this fact is readily evident and neatly summed up from the very titie of
Hannah Arendt’s analsyis of his life and trial; Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the
Banatity ofEvil. The entire goal of this work is precisely to dispel the misguided belief
that evil action requires a monstrous agent for its execution. Moreover, Stanley Miigram
poignantly testifies to arriving at the very same conclusion regarding the obedience
experiments where he writes,
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“I must conclude that Arendt’s conception of the banaÏity of evit cornes
doser to the truth than one might dare imagine. The ordinary person who
shocked the victim did so out of a sense of obligation — a conception of his
duties as a subject — and flot ftom any pecuiiarly aggressive tendencies.
This is, perhaps, the most fundamental lesson of our study: ordinary
people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on
their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Moreover,
even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear, and
they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental
standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to
resist authority.”(p. 6)29
With respect to Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment, the subjects involved in
the study, unlike the Miigram subjects, were aware of its simulated nature, and as a resuit
were even less prone to malevolent motivations. To recail the earlier detalled
discussion(23-26), the Stanford subjects, ordinarily descent people serving as voluntary
participants in a psychological experiment, were strongly influenced to behave
inappropriately by a series of prosaic factors that, while confusing and disorienting, were
nonetheless void of intrinsic ethical significance to the actors. Finaiiy, even in Abu
Ghraib, Zimbardo argues that the abusive military police were motivated more by
situational forces similar to those that contributed to the outcome of his Prison
Experiment, than they were by political or ideological stimulus.(26-30) The benign
nature of the behavior alternating forces present in ail the cases discussed contributes to
the conclusion that lack of virtue was not the outcome of the behavior in question but the
cause. In order for forces, of a benign nature, to gain such important behavioral impact,
the ethical entities with which they met, and upon which they acted, must have been
lacking in structurai fortitude. From this perspective the emphasis shifis ftom the
unreliability of character traits to the quaiity of character as such. Along Platonic lines, if
29 This themc is discussed in detail on pages 16-2 3.
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the ethical system to which the subjects affest to have maintained allegiance throughout
was insufficiently powerffil, or substantial, so as to thwart the banal behavior altering
forces at work in the challenging situation it encountered then it is the ethical system that
must be strengthened.
Moreover, the subjects, themselves, who behaved unethically claimed that their
actions, which ran contrary to their previously held belief system, were flot accompanied
by any change in their moral viewpoint. That is to say, testimonies from the subjects,
wherever this was available namely in Eichmann’s case and through post experimental
interviews with the Miigram subjects, point to the counter intuitive phenomenon that
their moral self images3° remained basically in tact in spite of actions that consistently
undermined this perspective. Adolf Eichmann claimed, quite incredulouosly, both to
have neyer feit any animosity towards the Jewish people and to have aiways lived his life,
prior to the trial, according to the Kantian categorical imperative that his will be
sufficiently noble so as to qualify as potential universal maxims.(p. 135-136) Similarly,
many of the Milgram subjects experienced veiy pronounced tension resulting from the
conflict between what they considered to be the values to which they had aiways adhered
and the situation that challenged them. One subject giggled and attempted to stifle his
laughter uncontrollably as he administered increasingly elevated levels of voltage and as
the learner’s screams became progressively tormented. He nonetheless continued to
shock the learner to the maximum voltage level. Post experiment, the subject proceeded
30 Stanley Miigram discusses the loss of the inhibitoiy force of self-image. where one may refrain from
performing harsh actions due to its consequences on hislher self-image, when one enters the agentic state.
The action is no longer seen as reflecting one’s owii motives and therefor Iras no beanng on one’s self
image.(p. 147) While this certainly does play a role in explaimng why the self-images ofthe subjects under
discussion were flot affected by their actions ît does flot undermine the present argument in so far as it is the
more fundamental issue conceming the facility with which one suspends one’s supposed values to begin
with that is in question.
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to describe his actions in terms which perpetuated his belief in his good character even in
the face of his highly questionable behavior; “T’m a nice person, I think, hurting
somebody, and caught up in what seemed a mad situation. . . and in the interest of science,
one goes through with it.”(p. 54). Another subject, a housewife, who in spite of lier
distress, causing irrepressible anxious utterances and shaking, continued to electrocute
the learner “to the end ofthe board, administering the 450-volt shock three times”(p.$O)
described herseif as follows in a post experimental interview; “I’m unusual; I’m
soflhearted, I’m a softy. I don’t know how I as a woman stand in relation to the other
women; they’re a liftle harder than T am. I don’t think they care too much.”(p. 83) The
incongmency ofthe subjects’ self-images and their behavior fiirther serves to substantiate
the Platonic position espoused throughout the essay. If these individuals can continue to
consider themselves to be people of good moral character when they have gratuitousÏy
inflicted harm on innocent, unsuspecting, victims then it is not a far stretch to conclude
that their understanding of what it tmly means to be virtuous is itself erroneous. The
interviewer, a member of the Yale School of Psychiatry, also points to insufficiently
developed ethical clarity as contributing significantly to the “lack of compassion”
demonstrated by the second subject described above. He writes, “It is flot surprising that
she failed to mobilize the psychic resources needed to translate her compassion for the
learner into the disobedient act. Her feelings, goals, and thoughts were too diverse and
unintegrated.”(p.$4) Yet, Nowhere is ignorance as to the tme essence of virtue more
apparent than in Eichmann’s contention to have abided by the Kantian imperative
discussed above. That a man, of relatively sound mmd, who has contributed to the
annihilation of hundreds of thousands of people can continue to perceive himself as
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abiding by such elevated ethical standards attests to a profound ignorance as to the
significance ofthe terms he utters. Eïchmann’s understanding ofthe ethical principles he
describes amounts to what can only be explained as an extremely superficial, self serving
and child like interpretation of complex philosophical constraints requiring acute,
enlightened and mature reflection.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence as to the validity of Plato’s faith in philosophy
as the vehicle to virtue, for the purpose of this essay, stems from the weaÏth of
information made available due to the unique methodological nature of the Miigram
experiments. More clearly, factors such as the subjects’ conviction as to the authenticity
of the experiment as well as detailed immediate and longer-term post experimental
interviews provide invaluable insight into the psyche of the individuals who participated
in the study. Providing the reader with an unaduherated view of first, the subject’s
spontaneous behavior, second, his/her explanation ofthat very behavior and finally ofthe
subject’s reflections once they had ffihly assimilated the consequences of the experiment.
These accounts show unequivocally that the subjects whose virtue was flot compromised
by the morally problematic situation that they encountered had, for a variety of reasons,
participated in philosophical reflection concerning ethical questions. As a resuit, these
individuals had recourse to a strong ethical foundation with which to confront the moral
conftision they faced. One such person is a professor of the Old Testament who
categorically refused to continue inducing the electrical shocks on the learner once he had
reached 150 volts. To the experimenter’s insistence that the subject “must continue” the
professor invoked arguments addressing the degree of the experimenter’s reflection
regarding the ethical soundness of the experiment, as well as the importance of both the
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learner’s will and the participant’s freedom to act according to hïs beliefs. In fact this
subject explains his decision to cease inducing shocks onto the learner as resulting from,
flot the negative choice to disobey the orders of the experimenter but, the positive choice
to obey the will of the learner.(p. 4$) Clearly, the individual’s religious convictions
contributed to his clarity of thought and ultimately to his choice of right action. This is
confirmed during an interview session wherein the tme purpose of the experiment is
revealed and, in response to the following question posed by the experimenter, “What in
your opinion is the most effective way of strengthening resistance to inhumane authority?
The subject answers, ‘If one had as one’s ultimate authority God, then it trivializes
human authority’ the answer for this man lies not in the repudiation of authority but in
the substitution of good — that is, divine — authority for bad.”(p. 49) Another individual
described in the study as having refused to continue to shock the learner at 255 volts is an
Industrial Engineer who emigrated from Holland to the United States afier the Second
World War. In his exchange with the experimenter, in much the same way as the
previous subject, he invokes the necessity to respect the leamer’s will to cease the
experiment, he questions the experimenter’s allegations as to the harmlessness of the
shocks sighting his personal experience as an electrical engineer, and finally evokes the
principle of freedom of choice in response to the experirnenter’s insistence that the
subject “has no other choice” but to continue with the experiment.(p. 51) Ibis man
shows intellectual resolve relative to questions of right conduct. Contrary to many of the
subjects who did flot choose to stop shocking the learner, this man spoke in an intelligent
and obviously reflected manner of the courage required in assuming complete
responsibility for one’s actions as opposed to transferring “the responsibility onto
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someone else” or in this case onto “the structure of authority”.(p.52) The subject’s
ability to act upon his convictions may stem from his experience and reflection upon the
obedience to a malevolent authority that he speaks of having witnessed in Nazi-occupied
Europe. This individual’ s interest and preoccupation with ethical questions is further
attested to by his conviction, expressed in a lerter written to the staff conducting the
experiment, “that the social sciences and particularly psychology” are of primordial
importance in today’s world.(p. 52) The final example of disobedience discussed in
Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authorily concerns a thirty one year old female Medical
Technician employed at the University Medical School who had emigrated from
Germany five years earlier. At 210 volts this subject firmly remarks “Well, I’m sorry, I
don’t think we should continue.” In spite of the experimenter’s insistence that the
experintent must continue, she remains resolute and consistent. Once again, in a manner
resembling the previous disobedient subjects she reffites the experimenter’s apparent
expertise regarding the harmlessness of the shocks, and imposes the importance of her
free will as well as that of the learner. As regards the woman’s responses Stanley
Miigram remarks that “The woman’s straightforward, courteous behavior in the
experiment, lack of tension, and total control of her own action seems to make
disobedience a simple and rational deed. Her behavior is the very embodiment ofwhat I
had initially envisioned would be truc for almost all the subjects.”(p. $5) It becomes
clear that the woman’s life experiences had provided her with the knowledge that
rendered her decision to disobey clear and definite. This subject had grown to
adolescence in Nazi Germany and “was for the gfeat part of her youth exposed to Nazi
propaganda. When asked about the possible influence of her background, she remarks
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slowly, ‘Perhaps we have seen too much pain’.”(p. $5)31 These examples of resilient
character traits, able to withstand enormous situational pressures, embody the pure
optimism of Platonic and Socratic philosophy; the edifying power of knowledge. These
individuaÏs, in the spirit of Odysseus, distinguished themselves from their fellow subjects
because their life experiences had exercised an edifying impact on their characters. That
is to say, in ail three examples discussed, the subjects appear to have acquired their moral
fortitude through reflection motivated by their life experiences and accompanied by the
crucial choices that culminated into virtuous character; their actions were flot and could
flot have been fortuitous. As a resuit, from this perspective, a plausible hypothesis
regarding the examples of lack of virtue discussed throughout the essay may be that
Eichmann, for example, armed with rîgorous and consistent moral training would have
been equipped to resist the situational pressures he encountered. He would have
possessed the tools by which to choose between salient goals and competing virtues. The
same can be argued regarding the subjects of the Zimbardo experiment and the Abu
Ghraib prison experiefice. Moreover, even those subjects who participated in the
Milgram study and failed to resist the pressure of authority attest to the tremendous moral
learning gained from participation in the experience. One such subject, one year
following the experiment,
“affirms .. . that he has definitely leamed something of personal
importance as a result of being in the experiment, adding: ‘What appailed
me was that I could possess this capacity for obedience and compliance to
a central idea, i.e. the value of a memory experiment even afier it became
clear that continued adherence to this value was at the expense of violation
of another value, i.e. don’t hurt someone else who is helpless and flot
31This statement ïs clearly reminiscent of the section of the myth of Er (61 9c-d). explored earlier (p. 80-82).
where Plato contends that the soul from heaven chooses the Jife of a tyrant because he Jacks “the discipline
of suffering”.
Virtue, The Fruit ofPhilosophy 97
hurting you. As my wife said, ‘You can cal! yourse!f Eichmann.’ I hope I
can deal effectively with any future conflicts of values I encounter. “(p. 54)
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Conclusion
The value and, consequent necessity, of ethical education is the insightffil and
invaluable principle that underlies the Platonic philosophy embraced in the present
testimony as to the aftainability and sustainability of virtuous behavior. This
preoccupation manifests itself throughout The Repubtic both in Plato’s deliberated and
poignant development of the necessity and nature of the philosopher miers’ moral
education as well as his more general insistence, culminating in Book X, on the
imperative of philosophy as savior of ail souls. In the first instance, ethical education is
conceived principally as an integral and rigorous component of a comprehensive
academic structure. While in its wider application, ethical education, assisted by a moral
guide, consists of profound philosophical reflection that resuits in the acquisition of
elevated intellectual principles. Principies that wili rightfully prevail over passion and
spirit thus allowing one to attain the summit of the human condition; the serenity of the
soul that resuits soleïy from a rational existence unencumbered by the ephemeral
entrapments of material and societal benefits. While the educational methods and
systems envisioned by Plato, as pertains to the instruction of the philosopher rulers in
particular, are in many ways unacceptable by contemporary standards32, the present day
pertinence of the principles that guide them is unquestionable. In sum, the fundamental
Platonic beliefthat good character demands life long rÏgorous intellectual training that
32 This statement refers principally to Plato’s views on the communal farnily, his elitist conception of
educational and his questionable curriculum timeline.
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incorporates the concerted efforts of environmental, institutional33, and academic34 forces
rings as true today, if flot more so, as it did over two thousand years ago. The collapsing
moral state to which the situationists point, and to which the horrifying examples
discussed in this essay testify, is proof that serious measures must be taken so as to
remedy the lack ofphilosophical reflection that is their foot cause. from this perspective,
comprehensive moral instruction, so lacking in contemporary society, becomes, flot only
preferable but, an urgent necessity. When theorists become so disheartened that they
simply resign themselves to ethical ineptitude and actually take pains to construct ethicai
theories that work around immorality it is time to take notice. The Platonic notion that
virtue, living a good life and happiness are inextricably linked is, from this perspective, a
truism the neglecting of which has, and will continue to have, serious and far-reaching
consequences. In contemporary western societies the previously existing sources of
moral education, church, state, community and famiiy, have ail but disappeared as
spiritual guides. They bave in fact been replaced by the abundant and immediate
proliferation of conventional wisdom more void of rational inspiration than ever. This
essay has attempted to show the relevance of Plato’s mistrnst of the unquestioned
assimilation of such prevailing norms and, consequently, the possibility and, ultimately,
the necessity of the pursuit of moral excellence.
The importance of environmental and institutionai influences on character is developed in the section of
the essay discussing character, i.e., p.51-57.
“‘ While the details of Piato’s conception of appropnate academic instruction fails outsïde the scope of this
essay what is retained for the purpose of the discussion at hand is thc importance of incorporating ngorous
ethical training into a formai academic curriculum.
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Ironically, the situationists help bring to light the very important first step that must
accompany the actualization of this Platonic inspired theory of the acquisition of virtue;
awareness as to the false sense of security that ail too ofien accompanies superficially
acquired virtue. The situationist daim that character traits are contextually dependent
inadvertently serves to signal the very same danger against which Er’s story cautions;
ethical complacency must be avoided at ail costs because it permits mistaken beliefs to
fester and rear their ugly heads only to manifest themselves into evil actions.(619c-d) In
his article, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics”, John Dons invokes contextualist
studies that point to the existence of overconfidence as concerns the self-prediction of our
ethical behavior suggesting that typically individuais mistakenly predict that they will
consistently behave in a virtuous manner.(p.516) The juxtaposition of this daim with
Dons’ more general argument that situation, flot character, determines behavior points to
the hypothesis that underlying unethical behavior is a moral smugness that resuits in a
lack of awareness as to the necessity for continued ethical growth. More clearly,
situationist findings inadvertently contribute to the understanding that it is precisely those
individual’s who possess an unjustified confidence in the stnength of their character that
set themselves up for ethical failure. This correlation implies that individual’s who are
ignorant to the exacting demands of true virtue and the need for continuous ethical
growth will be caught offguard when confronted with moral conundrums such as those
exposed in this essay. It is in this manner that reflection upon the situationist point of
view helps to satisfy the principle Platonic criterion of ethical knowledge; knowing that
we do not know what we think we know.
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The timeless truth seems to be that ethical education, if it is to build character strong
enough to face the pivotai challenges that define us as human beings, must necessariiy
permeate the very fiber of our existence. Striving to know right with the maximum clarity
possible is the only personal assurance we hold that Eichmann is flot eveiy mcm, that he
does not lie dormant in each of us waiting for the opportune situation to emerge. It is
only once phiiosophy, in the form of rigorous ethical education, is incorporated into our
personal and institutional systems that good character ceases to be merely an illusion
reflecting the habituated customs typically mistaken for virtue. The objective is to
develop good character resulting from profound ethical reflection, which, in tum,
manifests itself into virtuous goals and informed perceptions ofwhat is salient in morally
relevant situations. Thus arming ourselves against the conflicting virtues and biurred
ethical unes that render certain situations, as we have seen, SO morally precarious. The
etemal optimism of this Platonic perspective ïs the underlying belief that goodness is
intrinsic to human excellence and knowledge is its vehïcle which, if we embrace it fuiiy,
will, not only deliver us from the potentially dangerous web of as of yet unknown,
benign forces but also, assure the happiness that can only result from a life ofgoodness.
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